Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 - Page 44

maintaining consistent contact with soldiers who are geographically dispersed across a state, without significantly increasing operational tempo. To meet this challenge, commanders and sergeant majors should consider using technological tools to mentor junior leaders. One technique is holding periodic telephone conference calls or using Defense Connect Online sessions to target specific audiences (e.g., company commanders, squad leaders, or medics). Participants at a typical meeting could discuss a preselected professional development topic, emailed along with supporting material in advance. Round-table discussion will increase lines of communication, foster a stronger relationship between the different levels of command, and expand professionalism. Like it or not, the total force is under the public microscope, and even Congress is irked at what it sees.21 The good news is that this microscope can help us identify and understand issues that need prompt correction. We must not jeopardize our bond with the American people. We must continue to hone our professionalism each and every day. Summary The ARNG must sustain its ability to serve as an operational force. It must do this by retaining combat-experienced soldiers and leaders, generating and sustaining individual and unit readiness through expert training management, forging partnerships at every level and strengthening relationships, and honing the professionalism of its soldiers and leaders. By addressing each of these imperatives, the ARNG will be able to achieve its strategic objectives. Notes 1. See Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 29 October 2008); and National Guard Bureau white paper, “Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National Guard,” 2011, News/Attachments/ARFORGEN_Whitepaper_1AUG11.pdf. 2. See U.S. Army, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2013, submitted by John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno to the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 1st Session, 113th Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], May 2013), 5, http://usarmy.vo.llnwd. net/e2/c/downloads/302970.pdf. 3. For more information on readiness ratings and unit status reporting see Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration-Consolidated Policies, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 4. See John Garret, “Task Force Smith: The Lesson Never Learned,” (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 19 September 2000, 5. See Charles R. Anderson, a brochure published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, CMH Pub 72-11, “Algeria-French Morocco,” The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II series, (Washington, DC: GPO, October 3, 2003), http://www.history. 6. See Les’ Melnyk, Mobilizing for the Storm: the Army National Guard In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, Historical Services Division, 2001), 6, 42 7. The “Winograd Commission Report” refers to an Israeli government-sponsored study originally published in Hebrew, 30 January 2008, cited in Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2008). 8. Ibid. 9. Thomas Freidman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used To Be Us (New York: Picador, 2012). 10. For more about mentorship, see Army National Guard Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, The Army National Guard Leader Development Strategy, (Washington, DC: GPO, 6 November 2012), 10, 11. Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny McPherson, and Aidan Kirby Winn, “Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict,” Parameters, 40(1)(2010): 83. 12. For a discussio