Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 31

HURTLING TOWARD FAILURE

aircraft must manage enormous amounts of data and
information provided by their information systems.
The Air France (AF) Flight 447 disaster provides a case
study of how the complexity arising from information
systems intended to support operations can contribute
to catastrophic failure.

Too Much Information
On 1 June 2009, AF 447, from Rio de Janeiro to
Paris, crashed into the south Atlantic killing all on
board. The final report on the crash, published in 2012,
attributed the cause to a series of events and situations
that included training deficiencies, equipment failures,
procedural problems, and human error.4 Although the
plane was equipped with up-to-date electronic safety
systems, the information provided—some of it incorrect—confused the flight crew. They did not understand their situation, and their behaviors and decisions
led to the crash.
According to author Andrew Zolli, the use of
numerous safety systems on airplanes—and in any
type of operations—increases the complexity of the
whole until the safety features become sources of risk.5
The number of potential interactions between systems increases so much that the information becomes
unmanageable and unpredictable. Authors

J.M. Carlson and
John Doyle describe how complex
systems, whether natural or artificial,
can be “robust, yet fragile” because
they are robust in handling the expected,
yet fragile when faced with an unexpected scenario, a
series of small failures or problems, or a flaw in design,
manufacturing, or maintenance.6
Ever since Clausewitz described how the friction
inherent in war makes even the simplest of tasks
difficult, military commanders have desired certainty on the battlefield as a means to achieving victory.7
MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014

Achieving certainty depends partly on acquiring the
information needed to make decisions, so it is no
surprise that the military has sought to collect data
and information in its planning and decision methods.
Army doctrine first codified a formal decision–making
approach in 1932. Since then the doctrine has evolved
considerably, increasing the number of variables as
well as the complexity of the processes. The Army
now has its operations process and subordinate planning processes known as the Army design methodology,
the military decision-making process, and troop leading
procedures. Operations are considered so complex that
doctrine does not claim to provide a
one-size-fits-all decision-making
model; commanders are expected
to select a process or processes
appropriate to their situation. The operational art
construct serves as an
overlapping approach
that is supposed to
help commanders
understand
complex
situ-

ations and
integrate numerous
variables at tactical and operational levels.

Air France A330203 F-GZCP lands at
Paris-Charles de Gaulle
Airport, 28 March
2007. The aircraft
crashed during Air
France Flight 447.
(Photo by Pawel Kierzkowski)

Too Much
Complexity

Complexity theory is an
umbrella term referring to
the study of organizations as
complex adaptive systems that
must be able to receive and
adapt to feedback. In principle,
operational art incorporates
adaptabili