Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 - Page 23

DEFINING FORCE 2025 by the concept developer. The new idea is to establish a test venue and procedures dictated by the type of training and unit rather than the developer or evaluator. The testing hub may continue to be the Brigade Modernization Command at Fort Bliss, but that is not where the testing stops. Building a process that rapidly gets the right equipment to the field requires a menu of options—a series of tailored exercises that allow developers, testers, and units to work together to create a better product in a timely manner. but we risk losing our overmatch if we continue to rely on adaptation. The concept of strategic landpower calls for an expeditionary force fully trained and equipped for the next fight. Force 2025 will guide our Army to develop the right mix of capabilities to be regionally engaged and, if the Nation calls, to win decisively on the battlefield. Conclusion Force 2025 and its associated maneuvers strive to maximize the use of Army resources. Directed investment in the development of future capabilities aligned with future operational requirements should drive the design. As a midterm progress review, Force 2025 is needed for the Army to check its work, make necessary adjustments, and most importantly, put the right mix of capabilities on the ground. The Army of 2020 will sustain our capabilities in the short term, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters assigned to U.S. Army Europe’s 12th Combat Aviation Brigade land to pick up soldiers during a combined arms live-fire exercise at the Grafenwoehr (Germany) Training Area, 28 March 2014. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Glenn M. Anderson, USAREUR Public Affairs) Notes 1. To read about the strategic landpower concept, see U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command Strategic Landpower Task Force, “Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills,” by Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. McRaven, May 2013, http://www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/strategic-landpower.aspx. 2. Robert W. Cone, “Strategic Landpower” (lecture, 2013 Association of the United States Army [AUSA] Annual Meeting & Exposition, Washington, DC, 21 October 2013), http://www.army. mil/professional/ilw/landpower.html. 3. Ibid. 4. Robert W. Cone, “Shaping the Army of 2020,” Army Magazine (October 2011): 71-76; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 21 December 2009), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/capstone.pdf. MILITARY REVIEW  July-August 2014 5. U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center white paper, “Army Vision: Force 2025,” (Washington, DC: GPO, 23 January 2014), http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/USArmy_ WhitePaper_Army-Vision-Force-2025_23JAN2014.pdf. 6. For information on unified land operations see Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington DC: GPO, May 2012), http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf. 7. For more information on network integration evaluations, see the U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center website, http:// www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/network-integration-evaluation.aspx. 8. U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center white paper, “Army Vision: Force 2025 Maneuvers” (Washington, DC: GPO, 23 January 2014), http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/USArmy_WhitePaper_Force-2025-Maneuvers_23JAN2014.pdf. 9. William Hartzog, “A Time for Transformation: Creating Army XXI,” Army (1 January 1996): 53-59. 21