Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 108

THE ROCKY ROAD TO THE GREAT WAR:
The Evolution of Trench Warfare to 1914
Nicholas Murray, Washington, Potomac Books, 2013,
320 pages, $27.96

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icholas Murray examines the “theory and
practice of trench warfare” to help readers understand how the belligerents found
themselves deadlocked for four years. Murray, an associate professor of history at the U.S. Army’s Command
and General Staff College, assesses the development
and evolution of field fortifications from a theoretical
or conceptual perspective using four case studies: the
Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878; the second Anglo-Boer
War, 1899-1902; the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905;
and the Balkan War among and between the lesser
Balkan Powers and Turkey, 1912-1913.
The conventional wisdom is that the First World
War cost so many lives largely because of military
incompetence shared equally among the combatants.
The trenches made famous on the western front are
often cited as demonstrating the stupidity of the generals who presided over the fighting. However, though
incompetence abounded, it was not the only reason
for the slaughter of combatants during that war. In
1914, the technology of war had outstripped conceptual thinking about warfare. Even this explanation falls
short. Murray’s analysis of the development of field
fortifications provides some answers as to why things
happened as they did.
Murray examines the evolution of field fortifications through six themes he identified from reviewing
field fortification theory from 1750-1914. The themes
include: using field fortifications to prevent desertion,
providing physical protection for troops, enhancing
fighting power, reinforcing key tactical points, providing a secure base, and dominating an area. What
he found is that armies adjusted the employment and
use of field fortifications to keep pace with improvements in weapons and innovation in field fortification. Belligerents, as they had always done, developed
field fortifications along the best lines that the terrain
afforded and accounted for differences in that terrain.
Over time, these efforts led to more sophisticated,
more complex, and in the end, more effective works.
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Murray ably makes the case that army leaders carefully considered the role and use of field fortifications in
any war they might fight. Even leaders from those armies
who had no occasion to fight were able to analyze the
use of field fortifications because it remained common
until World War I for nonbelligerents to send observers
to combat zones. Observers were afforded good access
to the fighting by those at war. The U.S. Army and the
Europeans paid close attention to fighting they observed
or found themselves embroiled in, and learned many
valuable lessons. Murray draws many of his observations
from American observers of these campaigns.
Murray’s chapter on the state of military thought in
1914 is his best. Murray debunks the claim that Ivan
Bloch and others who argued that modern warfare had
become impossible were ignored. Murray argues that
Bloch was mistaken in much of his thinking. In any
case, Ivan Bloch was not ignored.
In only one particular is Murray unconvincing. His
assertion that the theory of field fortifications included the idea of using them to prevent desertion is not
entirely illustrated in the review of the cases he chose.
His contention seems logical nonetheless. For example,
deserting from a well-developed trench work would
not be as easy as leaving a formation on the mov