Critical and creative thinking about employing assets . Not everything that the 1ID achieved was due to an adaptation of , or refinement to , existing doctrinal principles . The division also applied critical and creative thinking to generate new ideas and learn from past doctrine . Over the course of its training progression for the WFX , the 1ID and its subordinate units experimented with multiple options for employment of key enablers . What emerged was a tension between centralized control and decentralized execution , between control of key assets and flexibility at the tactical edge . On one hand , the division had a broader view of the fight and could provide the most efficient use of key assets such as unmanned aircraft systems and counterfire radars . On the other hand , centralized control of assets such as mobile bridges might give the division positive control of their employment but ultimately would prevent subordinate units from rapidly seizing the initiative .
The task organization of key and critical assets should be a deliberate decision based on a larger , iterative discussion and articulation of roles and responsibilities at certain points in the fight between the division and its subordinate units . For the 1ID to conduct offensive tasks as part of decisive action , centralized control of Q37 weapon-locating radars under the DIVARTY allowed for better coverage and forward positioning . As the sole counterfire headquarters in the division , DIVARTY also monitored and recommended positioning of Q36 radars to fill gaps in Q37 coverage . Similarly , based on poor utilization of unmanned aircraft systems during the first two command-post exercises , the division centralized shadow systems under control of the CAB . With a centralized headquarters , the systems were much more responsive to intelligence collection requirements , while maximizing their utilization and capabilities .
In contrast , the division task-organized critical mobile bridging capabilities down to the lead brigades . While the division often lost visibility of this critical enabler , when the lead brigade saw an opportunity to conduct an unopposed water crossing , it was able to rapidly move the bridges to the proper location and seize the initiative . It is
It is likely there will always be a tension between maintaining centralized control of critical assets and maintaining tempo and combat capability at the lowest tactical levels .
BREAKING THE CRUCIBLE
likely there will always be a tension between maintaining centralized control of critical assets and maintaining tempo and combat capability at the lowest tactical levels .
An advance guard force . One of the greatest challenges facing any division performing offensive tasks as an element of decisive action is its ability to collect information around the clock and in any weather conditions . In the past , armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons were able to conduct aggressive reconnaissance against an unknown enemy force , make contact , develop the situation , and protect the main body of the maneuver force . With the loss of a dedicated ground reconnaissance capability at the division level , intelligence , surveillance , and reconnaissance operations have become almost synonymous with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems . In poor weather conditions or a high-threat environment , the division must place BCTs in the lead , often losing critical capabilities and combat power for the decisive operation .
To address this challenge , the 1ID developed an advance-guard capability , which allowed the division to make contact with the smallest elements possible , maintain contact with the enemy , protect the division ’ s main body , and provide the division commander flexibility in how he would mass combat forces . For the WFX , the 1ID took its trail brigade ’ s armored reconnaissance squadron ( ARS ), attached two additional tank companies along with engineer , air defense artillery , acquisition radar , intelligence , and sustainment assets , and put the ARS under the mission command of the CAB . A direct-support artillery battalion with two rocket batteries in a general support-reinforcing role provided responsive indirect fires as far forward as possible . This allowed the division not only to fight for information and protect the division ’ s main body but also to have a fourth maneuver unit , which provided flexibility in executing the plan . The use of the CAB as a higher headquarters for the advance-guard force provided several additional benefits , including the effective integration of unmanned aircraft systems , the optimization of air-ground operations in the reconnaissance-and-security fight , and the retention
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