Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 81

BREAKING THE CRUCIBLE

were responsible for maneuvering critical assets and
seventy mission-command digital master gunners
units around the simulated battlefield and engaging
across the division. The master gunners returned to
enemy formations with direct and indirect fires. They
their units and executed digital gunnery tables that
had to move quickly, react to changing circumstances,
developed a high level of proficiency throughout the
and employ weapon systems to their full capability.
division. Trained and certified digital master gunners
Within the WARSIM program, these are not intuisolved countless system-interoperability issues during
tive tasks; they require detailed u nderstanding of the
the command-post exercises and the WFX. Because
system’s functionality.
of their efforts, the 1ID was able to create shared
The 1ID incorporated the WARSIM and other
understanding across distributed mission-command
similar digital simulations into the division’s comnodes on an unprecedented scale.
mand-post exercises, and
Learning organizations.
subordinate units tracked
They knew their systems
Repetitions do not spontaneously
WARSIM operators by name.
result in mastery. Units must be
and processes, they knew learning organizations, in which
In addition to being experts at
their “weapon systems,” these
their teammates, and they leaders at all levels are capable
operators participated in planof seeing themselves in a critical
grasped
the
enemy
and
ning and rehearsals, and they
light and then adapting their
clearly understood the unit’s
perspectives, systems, and processoperating environment
mission and commander’s
es to improve the organization’s
that they would face.
intent. Their location within
performance. AARs and external
their respective command
evaluations were critical to the
posts provided them shared understanding of the
1ID’s development as an opportunistic unit. In addition
developing fight, and they were empowered to react
to partnering with the 35th Infantry Division for external
quickly to changing circumstances. Trained, informed,
evaluation, the Big Red One also drew on the strengths of
and empowered WARSIM operators were a critical
the institutional Army. With Fort Leavenworth just two
component in the division’s success.
hours away, the division benefited from a close workThe reason the command was able to empower the
ing relationship with the School of Advanced Military
WARSIM operators was because the division created
Studies, and it took advantage of the school’s vast depth of
and sustained shared understanding. Through a series
academic knowledge and real-world experience. Dr. Alice
of deliberate battle-rhythm events, aided by digital
Butler-Smith provided valuable insights for the 1ID’s
products that effectively communicated knowledge
planning. Faculty members from the School of Advanced
and understanding—not just information, leaders and
Military Studies—PhDs and fellows consisting of former
soldiers at all levels understood the mission, the situaArmy battalion commanders, future brigade commandtion, and the commander’s intent.
ers, and equivalent joint and international partners—
Digital master gunners. In a complex operating
served as observer/controllers during the division’s third
environment, units operate over great distances using
command-post exercise. Their feedback paid dividends
systems such as Command Post of the Future, Blue
during WFX execution.
Force Tracker, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
After the third command-post exercise, the 1ID
Systems, and Distributed Common Ground Systemteam looked and felt like a different organization than
Army. These are just a few of the systems that must
the one that started its journey eight months before.
function together to create an accurate common
Leaders at all levels worked with a confidence born of
operating picture that communicates shared undertrust and mastery. They knew their systems and prostanding across distributed mission-command nodes.
cesses, they knew their teammates, and they grasped
However, the highly technical capabilities needed
the enemy and operating environment that they would
for digital integration are not resident within units.
face. Most of all, they understood the plan and the
To address this deficiency, the 1ID worked with the
commander’s intent. They were ready for any challenge.
Mission Command Center of Excellence to train over
An opportunistic unit had been born.
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