BREAKING THE CRUCIBLE
In addition to creating opportunities for professional growth , the division conducted a robust leader development program . The program included professional readings , doctrinal classes , and professional development sessions with military and civilian leaders , including retired Generals Gordon Sullivan , David Petraeus , and Stanley McChrystal ; Lieutenant Generals H . R . McMaster and Gustave Perna ; Dr . Emma Sky ; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs Gonzalvo Gallegos ; and others . These sessions provided staff and subordinate units with valuable insights on leadership , mission command , and the current security environment . The final component of the leader development program was a series of warfighting-function clinics , where subject-matter experts presented topics relevant to their areas of expertise . The commanding general , division command sergeant major , deputy commanding generals , division staff primaries , battle staff members , and subordinate brigade and battalion commanders attended these clinics , which included dialogue on doctrine , best practices , and future employment .
The 1ID also built upon the experiences of other units to inform its planning and preparation . Key leaders observed the 1st Armored Division , 4th Infantry Division , and 101st Airborne Division WFXs , and the 1ID received augmentation of experienced intelligence personnel from the 25th Infantry Division . This collaboration with other divisions allowed the 1ID to capitalize on their experiences and begin its training at a high level . The 1ID also ensured that it shared its lessons learned at every step of its WFX preparation . The division commander updated all Active Component and National Guard division commanders after each command-post exercise , providing them the division ’ s after-action reviews ( AARs ), lessons learned , and best practices . The staff did likewise with their counterparts , effectively creating a large network of experienced leaders throughout the Army to share ideas and increase functional knowledge .
The division carried this information-sharing approach to its interactions with the other units that would be participating in the WFX . The 18th Airborne Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division would serve as the higher command and adjacent units , respectively , in the 1ID ’ s WFX . The 1ID worked closely with these units leading up to the exercise to develop a cohesive plan and rehearse execution . When it came time to execute the WFX , the 1ID staff had already developed solid relationships with their counterparts in these units , participated in planning sessions , and executed a command-post exercise from various distributed mission-command nodes across the Army .
1st ABCT and its battalions provided response cells that replicated the multiple BCTs that would fall under the 1ID during the exercise . They were also part of the team-building process . Battalion commanders and their staffs were included in every stage of planning and participated in three command-post exercises . From the lowest tactical unit response cell to the corps headquarters , the team had already worked together and overcome the kinds of challenges that often detract from mission accomplishment .
Just as critical as building great teammates within the 1ID was building the broader unified action team , including Total Army and institutional Army partners . The 1ID developed a strong partnership with the 35th Infantry Division from the Kansas National Guard , which provided observer / controllers and external evaluation for the division ’ s command-post exercises . The division further integrated critical staff members from its newly established 1ID Main Command Post Operational Detachment from the Nebraska National Guard . These staff members proved crucial for execution of the WFX , and they prepared for the key roles they would fill during the 1ID ’ s upcoming deployment . Just as directed in the Army Total Force Policy , 1ID integrated Army Reserve and National Guard forces at the division level , but it did not stop there . 11
The integration of the 300th SB and the 110th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade ( MEB ) further demonstrated the division ’ s commitment to building a total force . These Reserve Component partners were “ training units ” for the exercise , and they were critical to enabling the division ’ s opportunistic behavior . Realizing that the 300th SB and 110th MEB would have as few as eight days to train before the exercise , the 1ID developed comprehensive liaison officer ( LNO ) and technical support teams for each unit . These LNO teams were led and staffed by personnel from the 1st SB and the 97th Military Police Battalion , and they were responsible for ensuring that the 300th SB and 110th MEB were fully integrated and able to achieve their training objectives . Months before the exercise , the LNOs traveled to the
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