Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 73

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Disbanding LRS removes the last dedicated operational
surveillance formation available to corps and joint task
force commanders. To more effectively train and employ
these units, pathfinder and LRS companies should be
consolidated into an operational surveillance-and-reconnaissance battalion (OSRB). A no-growth reorganization
of the separate LRS companies to provide consistent
results across the Army is required. Companies within an
OSRB would maintain their habitual relationship with
the parent corps headquarters, but they would be able
to task-organize for purposes based on the mission, the
threat, and the friendly situation. A battalion composed
of LRS companies would deploy detachments rather than
teams; standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures;
increase by 30 percent the overall number of LRS teams
by reorganizing the communication and surveillance
sections; and improve rigger support.
LRS should be employed at the detachment level—
an improvement from independent teams. As demonstrated by Operation Red Wings, where the entire
burden of tactical mission command was placed on a
leader conducting surveillance, in small-unit operations the need is acute for tactical mission command by
company-grade and noncommissioned officers separate
from the actions at the objective.8 While many organizations, particularly surveillance units, are designed
for employment at the squad- or fire-team level, these
units require a mission support site in most cases.
This task organization would enable teams to focus on
their objectives while the mission support site covered
contingencies, long-range communication, and tactical
decisions between supporting elements.
While an LRS company is marginally sufficient to
train and deploy teams, it is insufficient to do the same
for platoon-sized detachments. The Army requires battalion commanders to certify that platoons are prepared
for operations. LRS detachments require a battalion
headquarters to certify their expertise in sophisticated
communication, high-risk infiltration, and surveillance
techniques. Having established a qualified battalion, employment of LRS elements should be modified to enable
the detachment headquarters’ role as a mission support
site, better mitigating operational risk
Lack of organic fire support and the reduction of
end strength weigh heavily against LRS employment.
According to the Force Management System website
table of organization, LRS companies were reduced from
MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017

a 139-person formation to a 100-person formation
(30 percent) as the battlefield surveillance brigades
disbanded in 2014 and 2015.9 The reorganization also
removed LRS fire support and tactical air-control party
support. An OSRB would enable the battalion to harvest positions from the pathfinder companies to form
a dedicated liaison officer team to each company, a role
currently filled by the communications soldiers and leaders pulled from other detachments within the company.
With liaison support, the LRS company should assign the
communication soldiers to the surveillance teams. This
would add three surveillance teams to each company,
for a total of twelve, and increase the communications
capability within each team. This would also preclude
the requirement to form ad hoc liaison support from
surveillance teams. Creating an OSRB would increase the
number of surveillance teams available from eighteen to
thirty-six across the active component and return fires
and tactical-aircraft control-party support to the LRS
without an increase in end strength.
Organizing the Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Leaders Course under the battalion headquarters
would enable LRS and pathfinder personnel to be
properly trained, save money, and ensure the battalion’s unique capabi lities were maintained to the
highest standard. This organization would also provide
continuity to the battalion, keeping the units at a high
level of proficiency rather than relying on specific personalities to ensure success.
Currently, each LRS company has a nine-rigger
detachment that provides direct support for static-line,
military free-fall, and airborne resupply operations. This
is an insufficient number of riggers to pack the two hundred plus parachutes required to certify a detachment for
military free-fall operations. Consolidation of the rigger
detachments into a single company in an OSRB would
enable a surge to cover intense training cycles instead of
requiring jumpers to pack their own parachutes. This
consolidation would further reduce the cost of maintaining three separate oxygen rooms, shakeout towers, and
parachute storage facilities. Oversight of the military freefall program would be safer and more effective, providing
two levels of qualified headquarters above the rigger
detachment (a rigger company and an OSRB headquarters). This battalion headquarters would understand the
capabilities and limitations of the systems and the personnel. The OSRB would provide continuity in high-risk
71