illustrates sixteen of the various groups inside and outside of the operational area , it does not account for “ friendly , neutral , and unknown ” actors and groups whose decisions and behaviors affect operations . These actors should also be included in a holistic analysis for appropriate engagement and effects assessment in order to produce the most comprehensive assessment of the OE .
Nevertheless , the participants did assess that the effects of the threat ’ s behavior and the population ’ s behavior would be “ a stalemate , with neither the government nor the insurgency gaining ground .” 27 More refined analysis , however , would reveal the factors that were influencing the most vulnerable portion of the population who did not fully support the insurgency and felt betrayed and disenfranchised by the legitimate government in Kiev . Thus , on one hand , future assessments would identify additional , interrelated PMESII implications involving military reform , anticorruption , and reconciliation initiatives by the Ukrainian government . On the other hand , continued assessments would identify implications of external defense support and ceasefire special monitoring missions by intergovernmental organizations .
Finally , while understanding how nonmilitary groups influence their OE can help military forces conduct successful operations , complex IPB assessments also reveal that the problems that lead to conflict
A Ukrainian company commander analyzes threat network associations and interactions during company-level intelligence and countering threat networks training 17 September 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center in Yavoriv , Ukraine . ( Photo by Josh Ryner )
cannot be solved by military force alone . Current hybrid threats and external influences will continue to exploit vulnerabilities and grievances if they are not acknowledged , holistically reconciled , and politically accommodated by the Kiev government . Therefore , the
64 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW