Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 65
COMPLEX IPB
Russian Orthodox
Church
President
Putin
Oligarchs
Mass media
General Staff of
Armed Forces
Logistics convoys
Main Intelligence
Directorate
(GRU)
Federal Security
Service
Novorossiya movement
Organized crime
Don Kossacks
Lugansk National
Republic
Separatist
paramilitary groups
Special purpose
forces
Diversion and
reconnaissance groups
Donetsk National
Republic
Crimea
Separatist
paramilitary groups
Ground forces
Russian Federation
Special purpose
forces
Diversion and
reconnaissance groups
People and
infrastructure
(Graphic by author)
Figure 2. Ukraine Hybrid Thread Threat Model
fact, network modeling and understanding of the mutually supporting relationships between the perceived
threat and threat supporting groups were also developed by the Ukrainian students (see figure 2).
As the intensity of warfare fluctuates, so do the
threats and employment of various weapons systems.
Therefore, since new technologies are constantly changing and complicating the OE, a more detailed analysis
identified specific adversary capabilities, tactics, and
courses of action. The analysis went a step further
by considering the effects generated from the many
possible combinations and permutations of overlapping
affiliations that could influence pro-government forces,
population behavior, and international assistance
efforts.25 For example, enemy diversion and reconnaissance groups appeared at the lower or tactical end of
the model and highlighted dispersed interactions. They
were associated with modified conventional weapons
and IEDs targeting government forces, civilians, and
critical infrastructure. As a note, other capabilities
MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2017
associated with diversion and reconnaissance groups
involved artillery correction, marauding, and kidnapping and interrogation. Next, since conventional
artillery had accounted for 85 percent of the casualties
on both sides of the war in Donbass thus far, it was
considered a greater threat than modified weapons and
munitions (e.g., mines and grenades) and IEDs during
a conflict that has fluctuated from high to low intensity
over a prolonged period.26 Furthermore, the conventional fires warfighting function was enhanced through
layered, unmanned aircraft system reconnaissance and
forward observation. This strategy was then coupled
with preplanned and massed multilaunch rocket systems and cross-border artillery strikes.
The exercise and subsequent discussions highlighted
shared-understanding requirements. Moreover, they
highlighted fundamentals for network engagement and
intelligence preparation, including analysis of the OE, and
of basic (measures of centrality) and group social networks and behavior. While the threat model in figure 2
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