Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 65

COMPLEX IPB Russian Orthodox Church President Putin Oligarchs Mass media General Staff of Armed Forces Logistics convoys Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Federal Security Service Novorossiya movement Organized crime Don Kossacks Lugansk National Republic Separatist paramilitary groups Special purpose forces Diversion and reconnaissance groups Donetsk National Republic Crimea Separatist paramilitary groups Ground forces Russian Federation Special purpose forces Diversion and reconnaissance groups People and infrastructure (Graphic by author) Figure 2. Ukraine Hybrid Thread Threat Model fact, network modeling and understanding of the mutually supporting relationships between the perceived threat and threat supporting groups were also developed by the Ukrainian students (see figure 2). As the intensity of warfare fluctuates, so do the threats and employment of various weapons systems. Therefore, since new technologies are constantly changing and complicating the OE, a more detailed analysis identified specific adversary capabilities, tactics, and courses of action. The analysis went a step further by considering the effects generated from the many possible combinations and permutations of overlapping affiliations that could influence pro-government forces, population behavior, and international assistance efforts.25 For example, enemy diversion and reconnaissance groups appeared at the lower or tactical end of the model and highlighted dispersed interactions. They were associated with modified conventional weapons and IEDs targeting government forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure. As a note, other capabilities MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017 associated with diversion and reconnaissance groups involved artillery correction, marauding, and kidnapping and interrogation. Next, since conventional artillery had accounted for 85 percent of the casualties on both sides of the war in Donbass thus far, it was considered a greater threat than modified weapons and munitions (e.g., mines and grenades) and IEDs during a conflict that has fluctuated from high to low intensity over a prolonged period.26 Furthermore, the conventional fires warfighting function was enhanced through layered, unmanned aircraft system reconnaissance and forward observation. This strategy was then coupled with preplanned and massed multilaunch rocket systems and cross-border artillery strikes. The exercise and subsequent discussions highlighted shared-understanding requirements. Moreover, they highlighted fundamentals for network engagement and intelligence preparation, including analysis of the OE, and of basic (measures of centrality) and group social networks and behavior. While the threat model in figure 2 63