Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 58

stimulate thought , not a definitive list . Commanders should assess factors such as the following when determining their method of control :

• degree of mutual trust between leaders in the unit

• degree of situational understanding

• degree of complexity associated with the mission ( i . e ., is the problem simple , complicated , complex , or chaotic ?)

• degree of protection inherent to the organization 17

• degree of synchronization required for the mission or subordinate missions

• complexity and type of terrain

• self-confidence of the commander

• proficiency of the organization and its subordinate units

• proficiency of subordinate leaders

• proficiency of the staff Commanders will likely gravitate toward detailed control in areas with low degrees of proficiency or high levels of complexity and complicated problems ( see figure 3 , page 54 ). Conversely , commanders will likely slide toward more directive control in areas with moderate to high degrees of proficiency and little complexity or complicated problems ( see figure 4 , page 55 ).

Furthermore , commanders must understand that the method of command and control is not static . Commanders must adjust their method of control based upon the continually evolving conditions . Another consideration is that organizations have multiple units . A commander may have a cavalry formation forward developing the situation on the ground , while the maneuver units are conducting a complicated , highly synchronized operation such as a wet-gap crossing . The commander would likely employ directive control with the cavalry formation , while retaining more detailed control for the part of the mission requiring highly synchronized operations . Upon completion of the complicated mission , the commander could revert to directive control .
The primary benefit of this approach is that it formally acknowledges the cognitive process a commander undergoes when thinking about how to command and control operations . Commanders and leaders at all levels conduct inventory of their subordinates and their organization before deciding how to approach commanding each person and unit . Subordinates and units requiring more oversight get more oversight . Conversely , those that can be trusted to operate more independently are often provided more latitude .
Moreover , while addressing the contemporary American way of war , this approach provides flexibility to the commander by not dictating a specific approach for commanding and controlling operations . If the Army adjusts the manner in which doctrine is written and adopts the idea of the directive and detailed control continuum , it will better address the realities of war , pulling doctrine from the theoretical into the tangible .
Notwithstanding , it is useful to observe that either method of command or combination thereof is largely dependent on the quality of soldiers tasked to perform the missions . Gen . George S . Patton Jr . articulated this requirement over seventy years ago when he wrote , “ To be a good soldier a man must have discipline , self-respect , pride in his unit and his country , a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and his superiors , and self-confidence born of demonstrated proficiency .” 18
Conclusion
In summation , mission command needs to be overhauled . The concept fails to provide specificity and therefore is at conflict with the Army ’ s culture and the new American way of war . The Army must harken back to its own history to define what it wants from each end of the continuum while not forgetting the praxis of the American way of war and the influence of the information age . Doctrine must not dictate one way or one end of the continuum over the other but must describe instead how commanders continually assess themselves , their units , their subordinates , their environment , and the threat or enemy when determining which approach to employ . The approach must be appropriate to each subordinate leader in their organization . By adopting a continuum of control , the Army will develop an approach that is at harmony with the Army ’ s culture and the manner in which it has long preferred to fight .
56 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW