Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 55

MISSION COMMAND through annihilation . Furthermore , according to Parker , it is built on finance , technology , diversity , and overwhelming firepower . 12
However , the conditions changed as information-age technological advancement occurred and the Soviet Union , with its large military force , disintegrated . These factors , coupled with the effects of globalism , have given rise to a relatively new theory on how the U . S . now fights . individual soldiers can cause strategic problems is at the heart of hypercontrol . To remove the risk of subordinate leaders making , or accidently allowing , their subordinates to make strategic mistakes , constraints are emplaced , observation is ubiquitous , and heuristics such as the strategic corporal are developed to mitigate risk . The reduction of collateral damage and killing without closing with the enemy by employing precision munitions and precision forces , controlling
Detailed control
Key
Low
Medium
High
L
M
H
Directive control
L M H
L M H
Mutual trust
Understanding
Commanders adjust approach from analysis of these factors
L M H
L M H
Terrain complexity
Leader self-confidence
L M H
Inherent protection
L M H
Proficiency of unit ( s )
L M H
Type of mission ( level of complexity )
L M H
Leaders ’ proficiency
L M H
Level of synchronization required
L M H
Staff proficiency
Figure 2 . Factors Determining Method of Control
( Graphic by author )
Military theorist Antulio Echevarria suggests that U . S . forces “ shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs ... into strategic successes .” 13 He agrees with Russell Weigley and Max Boot that this lack of clear thinking stems from an emphasis on destroying the opponent , rather than taking into consideration the results of tactical victory . 14 In this construct , “ control-mania ,” or a method of command and control that seeks to supersede risk and battlefield error through detailed control , appears to be a major byproduct of the information-age-fueled American way of war . The fact that
narratives , and seeking perfect understanding all fly in the face of the less controlled mission command approach that focuses on individual initiative , trust , and accepting prudent risk . Mission command reinforces the American focus on warfare ( operational and tactical victory in battle ) rather than war ( strategic and political victory ) due to the concept being derived from a German operational concept for winning quick battles of annihilation .
At this point , it is instructive to harken back to Leonhard ’ s theory of command and control to understand how information-age technology encourages
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