Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 50

in Mexico, the underappreciated conflict holds opportunity for further study as heirs to the legacy of nineteenth-century forces train to “win in a complex world.”
While the Civil War and the Second World War
typically garner the attention of historians, they reflect
mobilization paradigms the United States is unlikely
to soon experience. Later interventions in Korea and
Vietnam, though less vast, likewise reflected far larger
investments than recent campaigns in Mesopotamia
and South Asia enjoyed. Though no future is certain,
these trends suggest that the Army—now smaller than
at any time since 1940—will accomplish future forced
entries under substantial resource constraints with
increasing reliance on joint cooperation.24
This circumstance imparts new relevance to the
Mexican-American War. Beyond decisive victories
at storied places like Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, and
Chapultepec, the Army’s ability to collaborate with maritime partners, integrate volunteer contingents into a “total
force” concept, and apply balanced governance policies in
occupied territories led to the efficient attainment of most
national objectives. These mutually reinforcing tactical,

operational, and strategic efforts, especially when contrasted against recent suboptimal outcomes in Iraq and
Afghanistan, reveal a time when commanders successfully
planned and directed, as now required by joint doctrine,
the “deployment of forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.”25
Looking forward to a new century of campaigns, the
implications of the United States’ historic victory in the
Mexican-American War are clear: its land power institution must train and equip to win across all the phases
of expeditionary warfare as it deploys to seize initiative,
dominate the enemy, and stabilize war-torn regions.
Accomplishing these tasks, which fulfills the Operating
Concept’s requirement to “deter adversaries; respond
rapidly to crises; and conduct expeditionary maneuver
against enemy forces,” will require seamless unity of
effort between diverse elements of U.S. national power.26
If the war against Mexico demonstrated the potential
for the Army to lead multifaceted teams to decisively
win on distant and unfamiliar terrain, future endeavors
in far-flung theaters will surely provide the opportunity,
and ultimate crucible, to do so once again.

Notes

1. Patrick J. Murphy and Mark A. Milley, A Statement on the
Posture of the United States Army 2016, presented to the 114th
Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
March-April 2016), accessed 10 November 2016, https://www.
army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/aps/aps_2016.pdf; “2015 Index
of U.S. Military Strength,” The Heritage Foundation website,
accessed 8 November 2016, http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/; Dan Parsons, “Odierno Calls For Ex