Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 49

EXPEDITIONARY LAND POWER General Scott’s Entrance into Mexico City (1850), hand-painted lithograph, by Carl Nebel. (Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons) regulars and volunteers contributed to the combined force. The commanding general employed a disciplined professional infantry to occupy the urban centers and to train allied Hispanic soldiers. He unleashed federalized Texas Rangers—irregular cavalry who had fought Mexicans and Indians for decades along embattled frontiers—to suppress the implacable guerrillas that preyed on convoys and outposts. Despite their tactical effectiveness, the Rangers’ brutality toward Hispanic civilians threatened to undermine the expedition’s broader pacification efforts.21 The final phase of expeditionary warfare enables a civil authority to “regain its ability to govern and administer to the services and other needs of the population.”22 As seen in recent operations in the Middle East, ideal transition conditions can be difficult to achieve. They sometimes require reengagement of forces. Identifying and empowering legitimate indigenous governing institutions can also be complicated by social and ethnic fracturing common in war-torn countries. In the end, expeditionary forces usually attain a manageable political outcome—as opposed to a perfect one—in MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017 order to allow redeployment of combat power from the occupied territory. Despite its precarious position at the close of the Mexican-American War, the Army’s threat to occupy northern Mexico indefinitely, with enduring naval support, enabled diplomatic counterparts to negotiate strategic concessions in exchange for a peaceful withdrawal. The United States paid $15 million for 529,000 square miles across parts of what is now New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, Utah, and California, while solidifying control of Texas.23 Mexico, under foreign rule and suffering massive peasant revolts in the Yucatan region, bitterly conceded the territory to regain sovereignty. The American garrisons then redeployed to once again secure newly expanded frontiers. Though the settlement reflected aggrandizement that the international community now would consider unacceptable, the phased campaign set precedence for similar force projection cycles—some successful and some not—throughout succeeding centuries. Given the strategic success of the American expeditions that fought through adversity and uncertainty 47