Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 24

the preparation of command-implementation plans and concept plans per Army Regulation 71-32 , Force Development and Documentation . 13
While the main effort to create new TDAs for FY 2019 did not create any significant new behaviors , the core-process review and staff-merger effort did attempt to identify potential new organizational options . One option considered was combining the Office of the Assistant Secretariat of the Army for Manning and Reserve Affairs and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 so that policy creation and operational planning and execution would be within one organization vice two . In addition to new organizational structures within the headquarters , the core-process review and staff-merger effort looked at potential new processes to streamline the existing workload . Task force subject-matter experts examined the TAA ( a process that supports the size and skill distribution of the Total Army ) and select steps of the PPBE process . These potential changes in organizations and processes were tasked as areas for further analysis due to external oversight factors , the ongoing reorganization , and existing roles and responsibilities defined in General Order 2012- 01 , vice tackling as part of the overarching effort .
What Was Achieved
The HQDA Comprehensive Review developed and executed the reduction of the HQDA staff by approximately 2,100 personnel authorizations by FY 2019 . 14 These reductions constitute approximately 15 percent of the effort ; the headquarters does achieve the 25 percent target when incorporated with the FARG reductions and significantly reduces the number of echelons within the staff by flattening the organization . These reductions also increased manager median span of control to eight from as little as one across much of the headquarters , in addition to reducing the percentage of managers by one-third . The reorganized agencies eliminated 70 percent of same-grade reporting , vastly improving vertical information flow , and senior leaders ( those at the GO and SES levels ) have increased roles and direct responsibilities over more processes and information . The effort moved 94 percent of the GS-15s to or above echelon five , which better aligns talent to decision making , rather than just informing decisions . Additionally , it reduced the use of deputies below echelon three ( two-star GO and SES level ) by FY 2019 .
Overall , these changes successfully flattened HQDA , increasing effectiveness and efficiency , and placed the headquarters on par with other large corporate headquarters . While implementation and rebalancing of personnel to open positions remains to be accomplished , the Office of the Administrative Assistant supported by the United States Army Force Management Agency ( USAFMSA ) and the affected organizations completed documenting the de-layered and reorganized changes in TDAs by 1 October 2015 ( FY 2016 ).
To complete implementation , HQDA developed the Intermediate Review Council , allowing a forum to adjudicate issues not addressed or developed during the effort and ensuring the de-layering principles would not be violated or discarded in the future . They managed TDA documentation with USAFMSA and the affected agencies , working to align on-hand personnel and remaining authorizations so the authorization reductions could be reached through natural attrition . The full implementation and realization of the loss of the personnel authorizations identified during the FARG and the HQDA Comprehensive Review will incrementally run until FY 2019 .
Conclusion
While the effort will not be fully implemented until 1 October 2018 ( FY 2019 ), the senior leadership must maintain awareness of any external changes or decisions that may affect the HQDA Comprehensive Review implementation . As with any project or reorganization , stable leadership continuously measuring the effort is key to achieving the objectives as defined in their vision . Despite senior leadership ( SA , USA , and CSA ) moving on to other duties , the new leadership continues to implement the authorization reductions in accordance with the documented changes .
The HQDA Comprehensive Review effort would have benefited from having a continuous communication plan throughout the change review that was targeted to inform all levels of the organization . The lack of information transparency was a critical misstep . Better communication to the lowest level in HQDA could have aided in the speed of change and overall support for the effort . Publishing a headquarters concept plan could have provided a clear end state for the workforce to align to and identify other potential ways to accomplish the various tasks .
22 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW