Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 45

DENIERS OF “THE TRUTH”

everything. Critical thinking was difficult to limit to
just one subject.
Amazingly, there were even more officers uncomfortable with questioning their fundamental
assumptions about warfare.1 Today I realize that
SAMS could only do so much in introducing different ways to approach the subject. Even after looking
into postmodern philosophies, alternative construction of social meaning, and complexity theory and
systems thinking, the SAMS curricula could not
break away from the demands of the Army in forcing upon us the technically rational paradigm.2 Thus,
after studying how complex adaptive systems resist
reductionist understanding and deliberate, rational
approaches—we launched into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), center of gravity analysis,
and backwards, intuitive planning.3
But why should we approach warfare the same
way most of us approach religion? Is it any coincidence that most military officers believe in the technically rational paradigm, even if largely unaware of
what it is, much less critically questioning it?
In this article, I will describe an exploratory
research effort I participated in to offer a reflective practice approach that might better serve

our military.4 This study consisted of observations made during 14 iterations of the U.S. Army
Special Forces Qualification Course’s Robin Sage
exercise for more than a year’s time wherein,
mostly indeterminantly, I introduced some of the
concepts found within design into the planning
portion of the training.5 As my time in command
neared an end, I more consciously engaged in
conversation with students about some of the
concepts behind design. From my viewpoint, I
observed a difference between those who had no
exposure to design, those who had some exposure, and those who received a little more than
some. Of the student teams during the last two
iterations of my command, two of them were
encouraged to approach their mission planning in
a more unstructured manner, and during a class
on planning, I engaged with all the officers in a
conversation about different planning methods to
include design.6
My observations, admittedly very subjective
and unscientific, follow. My hope is that further
experimentation can improve upon the military’s
use of unstructured approaches to warfare, especially in complex operations such as counterinsurgency, unconventional
warfare, and the like.
I assert that our religious-like belief in the
technically rational
paradigm has us wedded to an approach
to warfare that seems
intuitively effective,
but is largely illusory.
This study supports
the Army Special
Operation Forces
(ARS =