Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 25
ISAF JOINT COMMAND
of the relationship, which in turn
helped both make the transition
in mindset.
Lesson four: integration.
Fourth, transitions, as with strategic communications, should be
integrated across lines of operation.
Commanders should regularly reassess and reprioritize each transition
to synchronize it with operations in
support of campaign objectives. The
ISAF Joint Command tracked and
managed many simultaneous transitions. They emphasized certain ones
at different times by prioritizing the
realignment of headquarters early in
the year and the shift from unit-level
TAA activities to functionally based
SFA, along with base closures and
force posture reductions later. The
key is recognizing that transitions
will occur concurrently across lines
of operation, and commanders and
staffs must be aware of the interactions of various transitions so they
can better manage the whole.
Lesson five: key leader role.
Fifth, some transitions required
a centralized, top-down manage(Photo by Pfc. Dixie Rae Liwanag, 55th Combat Camera)
ment process, especially for assets
Brig. Gen. David Haight exchanges greetings with Afghan National Army Maj. Gen. Mohammad Yaftali, the commander of the 203rd Corps, at the Kabul Military Training Center
on which commanders depended.
in Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 April 2014. The Kabul Military Training Center is the largest
Key leaders were the locus for action.
Afghan National Army training facility.
Only they could cut through inerunderstanding. The ISAF Joint Command recognized
tia-laden bureaucratic processes—such as the Foreign
that certain transitions would alter its relationship with
Excess Personal Property and Foreign Excess Real
the ANSF and that communication along the way could
Property programs—to effect change. These programs,
prevent misunderstandings.
which entail numerous steps to transfer property to
Before the elections, it was important to mainforeign governments, were streamlined to expedite the
tain sufficient support so that the ANSF could susresponsible transfer of excess material to the Afghans.
tain their operational momentum against the eneBetween June and November 2014, the United States
my; however, afterward the ISAF Joint Command
transferred equipment valued at over $850 million
precipitously reduced enablers to retrograde excess
through the Foreign Excess Personal Property program
equipment and set conditions for Resolute Support. alone, saving American taxpayers millions of dollars in
The Command clearly explained to the Afghans the transportation costs. Commanders’ involvement simplinature of the changes well in advance to help them
fied and expedited an extraordinarily complex process.
adjust their expectations. Candid communication
Some requirements will be imposed while othhelped both sides acclimate to the shifting nature
ers will be conditions-based. The 1 January 2015
MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2015
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