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LUKBAN
Chapter 8 ‘ Kill and Burn ’

The atrocities committed by the American troops after Balangiga were not the sole responsibilities of Gen . Jacob H . Smith or his alleged hatchet man Maj . Littleton Waller . Smith ’ s orders , though excessive , stemmed directly from policies spelled out by his superiors in the war department . The responsibility went all the way to US President Theodore Roosevelt who told Chaffee adopt “ in no unmistakable terms … most stern measures to pacify Samar ,” and Secretary of War Elihu Root who replaced MacArthur with Major General Adna R . Chaffee on July 4 , 1901 . Root had picked MacArthur ’ s replacement in February , realizing that MacArthur opposed implementing civilian rule of the Philippines before the war ended . 1

Root could not have chosen a better man for the job . Chaffee began his military career as a private , but he won a battlefield commission at Gettysburg and later served as a cavalryman under General Sheridan . Chaffee earned a well-deserved reputation as a tough Indian fighter , campaigning against the Cheyenne and the Apaches . Leading his troop in a charge against the Cheyenne , he had inspired his men by yelling , “ Forward , if any man is killed , I will make him a corporal !” Before his assignment to the Philippines , Chaffee had served in Cuba and led American forces to Peking during the Boxer Rebellion . Two months after he took over from MacArthur , he would direct the implementation of the most repressive counterinsurgency policies seen in the Philippines . 2
Within weeks of the Balangiga attack , four hundred insurgents armed with long , slightly curved knives common in the Philippines assaulted another Army detachment on the Gan dara River in Samar , killing ten soldiers and wounding six . Additionally , a small garrison at the town of Weyler was be sieged for nearly two days , and several other minor stations on Samar were also attacked on a smaller scale . Because of these events , General Chaffee is reported to have metaphorically equated the Army ’ s tenuous hold on the archipelago with standing on a volcano . On many morn ings , the general would alarmingly ask his staff , “ Has it blown up yet ? . . . The volcano , damn it ! The volcano we ’ re
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