Lukban Lukban | Page 106

LUKBAN
the war against the insurgents . “ It is a portion of the insurrection which had been conducted by General Lukban , who has never been suppressed . There are plenty of soldiers there to ultimately subdue the rebellion in the island of Samar ,” he said . At that time , the occupation forces of Samar were estimated to be 2,000 to 2,500 , distributed in its increasing garrisons . 35
The same news item reported that according to Gen . Hughes , the Visayas commander to which Samar belonged , the insurgents had only 300 rifles since most of them were armed only with bolos . But “ they carried on a guerrilla warfare and operations against these were difficult …. The fact that the Americans were attacked while at breakfast indicates the daring and pluck of the insurgents .” 36
That same day in the issue of the Chicago Tribune , Gen . Elwell S . Otis , who was in command of the department of the lakes , also dispelled ideas of a widespread rebellion . He said that the slaughter of members of Company C of the 9 th Inf . in Samar did not mean that there was anything like widespread revolt in that province . “ The location of the ambuscade is in southern Samar of which the insurgents are ignorant and barbarous . Probably Lukban got a party of bolomen together and surprised the Americans while at breakfast .” 37
On the 30 th that month in Akron Ohio , the Akron Daily Democrat in its front page wrote that the “ massacre shocked the U . S . public .” Many newspaper editors accordingly tagged the event as “ the worst disaster suffered by the U . S . Army since Custer ’ s last stand at Little Big Horn .” Already , a change of policy regarding the insurgents of Samar was becoming evident in the statements of an infuriated Maj . Gen . Adna R . Chaffee , military governor for the “ unpacified ” areas of the Philippines . He told the press that “ the situation calls for shot , shells and bayonets as the natives are not to be trusted .”
He advised newspaper correspondent Joseph Ohl , “ If you should hear of a few Filipinos more or less being put away don ’ t grow too sentimental over it .”
Chaffee informed his officers that it was his intention “ to give the Filipinos ‘ bayonet rule ’ for years to come ,” an attitude that President Theodore Roosevelt showed when he ordered Chaffee to adopt “ in no unmistakable terms … most stern measures to pacify Samar .” 38
Chaffee in turn ordered his commanders in the field : “ We have lost one hundred rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition at Balangiga . You must get them back . You can have $ 5,000 gold . Capture arms if you can , buy them if you must ; whatever course you adopt , get them back .” 39
To absolve himself of the responsibility over the Balangiga disaster , Chaffee was quick to blame his subordinate Gen . Hughes . In a memo , he told the latter , “ It comes to my attention that Company C of the 9th Infantry
106