Policy and Complex Systems
10 other regional planning commissions ( RPCs ) collaborate with the State to incorporate the regional transportation planning needs . The planning process and financial structure developed in ISTEA , TEA-21 , and SAFETEA-LU creates both a complementary and competitive partnership between the RPCs / MPO and VTrans . Federal legislation directs the state to act as an intermediary between the MPOs / RPCs and the US DOT . ISTEA required each state transportation agency to accumulate each transportation improvement plan ( TIP ) from MPOs and assemble a Statewide Transportation Improvement Program ( STIP ). Similar to the MPO , the state must demonstrate the need for a project , the financial requirements , and the proposed funding location . In addition , each state is required to create a statewide Long Range Plan ( SLRP ). Congress ’ s choice to require both the state and individual MPOs to create an LRP and TIP demonstrates its intent to commence planning at the local level while requiring involvement with all agencies and individuals with expertise in the transportation sector .
Depending on state regulations , the state completes federally funded projects by either distributing money to a municipality or completing the project themselves . The process of prioritizing transportation projects is rather more complex and relatively poorly understood . In the state of Vermont , for example , we deployed focus groups and interviews with state , regional , and local government officials to elicit the current institutional rule structure , i . e ., the “ rules-in-use ” for project prioritization that are followed by the state and MPOs / RPCs in prioritizing transportation projects ( see Ostrom ( 2005 ) for “ rules-in-use ”). These rules are different for six transportation project classes , which are roadways , paving , bridges , bike / pedestrian , traffic operations , and park and ride . In this article , we focus on roadway projects . An asset management system was developed in VTrans in 2006 to assign expected value scores to roadway projects for two specific criteria . Prior to 2006 , transportation projects were prioritized through a political process of negotiation among the regional and state agencies . The introduction of these rules in 2006 was part of a broader “ de-politicization ” process , as stated by many focus group participants . For the roadway projects , VTrans evaluates each project on four criteria : highway system is assigned 40 % weight , and cost per vehicle mile is assigned 20 % weight . Both highway system and cost per vehicle mile for a given project are “ objectively ” estimated from the VTrans asset management system . Furthermore , regional priority is assigned 20 % weight and “ project momentum ” is assigned 20 % weight . Noticeably , while asset management system-based criteria ( e . g ., highway system and cost per vehicle mile ) might protrude an air of objectivity , the criterion of “ project momentum ” is subjective and , according to a focus group participant , could even be used for “ gaming the project prioritization system ”. Later , in this article , we demonstrate how changing the weights , both formal / objective and informal / subjective , provided by state agencies and RPCs can have a drastic effect on funding patterns .
Within the legal and policy context described above , the challenges posed by climate change induced extreme events , such as increasing frequency of floods , storms , and hurricanes , as well as macro-economic shocks , e . g ., funding sequestration driven by political cycles ( Baumgartner & Jones , 1993 ), periodically test the resilience of transportation systems . It is increasingly recognized that extreme events induced by global climate change
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