A Complex Adaptive Systems Analysis of Shaka Zulu and the Mfecane
Shaka ’ s conquering Zulu impis set in motion a domino effect as peoples dislodged by the Zulu in turn fell upon their neighbors to drive before them in headlong flight a cascade of refugees ( Bryant , 1929 ; How , 1995 ). The Zulus and their competitors initially used long throwing spears with relatively light heads called assegais . The weapon was relatively ineffective as it was hurled at an enemy some distance away and could not be relied on to strike its target ( Bryant , 1929 ; Webb & Wright , 1976 , 1979 ). Even if the assegai did hit an enemy , a shield could turn it aside and the light blade did not always inflict a serious wound ( Reader , 1966 ). Shaka designed a weapon intended for close-in engagement of the enemy with a stabbing assegai ( Gluckman , 1960 ). The design of the stabbing assegai allowed it to thrust underhand , with a heavy broad blade and a thick-shortened haft ( Stevenson , 1968 ). Shaka also significantly altered the use of the defensive shield , using it to entangle an enemy , throw him off balance , and expose him to a fatal thrust ( Gluckman , 1960 ).
The new weaponry shifted the focus of battle from staying back to bombard the enemy with throwing assegais to closing with the enemy , engaging in close combat and stabbing with the radically new type of assegai ( Stevenson , 1968 ; Webb & Wright , 1976 ). This shift in the schema of how to conduct a battle gave rise to the development of new forms of battlefield maneuver ( Webb & Wright , 1979 ). Shaka first developed new tactics of maneuver while commanding a regiment of warriors of Dingiswayo ’ s Mthethwa tribe , “… seeking to pin an opposing clan down with the central group while the two flanking parties raced out to surround it ” ( Morris , 1965 , p . 48 ).
Along with new weapons and tactics , Shaka brought new strategy .
Previously warring tribes had permitted losers to sue for peace and continue with business as usual after territorial or other concessions , meaning that previously vanquished foes arose again and again , which made no sense to Shaka ( Gluckman , 1960 ). Shaka also intensified the pattern of warfare , exterminating all adult males , and capturing women , children , and cattle ( Stevenson , 1968 , pp . 33-34 ).
The strategy of “ join the Zulu victors or die ” was inconceivable to the Southern Bantu tribes . “ Thus , instead of living to fight another day as previously , a vanquished enemy had no choice but to accept incorporation with the victors . According to the Bantu code of arms this was unethical , but it was also devastating ” ( Bryant , 1964 , p . 48 ).
As indicated above , researchers have proposed a number of alternative theories on the nature and origins of the Mfecane over the years . Gump ( 1988 ) criticizes the conventional explanation on two grounds . First , it looks at only an isolated segment of an on-going process , ignoring both causal processes and post-Mfecane developments . Secondly , by concentrating on only the military aspects , the conventional explanation ignores other significant parts of Zulu society ( Gump , 1988 ).
The population pressure explanation suggested by Max Gluckman simply takes the increase in population as given without any deep inquiry into any cause thereof . According to Gluckman ( 1960 ), Nguni societies expanded by splitting as sons would leave their fathers ’ homesteads to set up their own establishments . The increased population coupled with expanding need for territory led to competition for land ( Perry , 1999 ). This extensive approach to land use meant the Nguni soon ran out of space , creating an urgent need for the reinvention of the Nguni polity ( Gump , 1988 ). Omer-
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