Journal on Policy & Complex Systems Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2014 | Page 41

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consciously wants to do what A desires ” ( Digeser , 1992:979 ). Therefore , if B acts against his / her interests , then power is being exercised . Geyer and Rihani ( 2012 : 29 ) argue that these values and norms are a part of a unique set of human experiences coupled with countless collective interactions , producing “ complex interpretative outcomes .” Likewise , Lukes ( 2005 ) tells the story of power conceptually , a story not moving in an orderly , largely predetermined direction , but rather unpredictably , and wholly indeterministically xiv
“ A may influence the behavior zof B because B is fearful of the reactions of A to a given course of conduct ; or B may be accommodating to A because B wants to stay in the good graces of A for future advantage ” ( Stone , 1980 : 979 ). Systemic Power has positive and negative elements and may or may not have elites purposively manipulating the system , but nevertheless , the outcome is a system where power is asymmetric among people , creating advantages and disadvantages , which are outputs of a system of policy decisions . xv
Similarly , Meadows ( 2008 ) notes that these inputs , or “ agents ” move through a black box and turn into outcomes , or are emergent . xvi
Many scholars have criticized Dahl ’ s pluralist conception , or non-conception of power , as it fails to challenge domination in society , or what is called the power over conception ( Domhoff , 2005 ; Imbroscio , 2010 ). Stone ( 1980 ) points out that power is often defined in terms of how it acts in an overt and purposive ways among people . He argues , however , that power relationships are more complex than what can be observed . Power itself , is not as interpersonal as Foucault ( 1980 ) and others observe , but intergroup with interrelations between strata and classes . Power is not only intentional , but contextual , as it is a matter of “ logic ,” or nature of the situation . xvii
Feedback itself is an abstraction ( Biggs 2003 ), essentially a mental construct , representing multiple conceptual levels ( Eve , Horsfall , and Lee �1997 ). xviii
“ The casual link is defined as negative if B changes in the opposite direction , decreasing if A increases and increasing if A decreases .” xix
Savas ( 1970 ) finds that the word cybernetics derives from the Greek for steersman , governor , pilot , or rudder , which is the same root as government Dobuzinskis ( 1987 ) argues that Cybernetics is the study of systems that are self-organizing . This system , he argues , moves past the issues of the " first cybernetics ,” which the science and politics and science of control to that of the self-organizing capabilities and autonomy of complex systems . Chapter 4 : Strategic & Systemic . Retrieved from http :// www . mftlicense . com / pdf / sg _ chpt4 . pdf xx
Deviation Amplification . xxi
“ The concept of feedback opens up the idea that a system can cause its own behavior .” Meadows ( 2008 , 19 %). xxii
Feedback itself is an abstraction ( Biggs 2003 ). Systems thinking focuses on the feedback identification of processes and dynamics influencing system behavior . Easton and Deutsch , for example , were early social science proponents of applying feedback to social theory ( Richardson , 1999 ). Easton ’ s central question is “ what keeps a political system in power ? Feedback plays a vital role ” ( Richardson , 1999:205 ). He argues that there is a constant current of influences , or also known as , inputs from the political system itself into and throughout the environment . Influences , he continues , are divided between two types : 1 ) support and 2 ) demands ( Figure 4 ). In political systems , demands and support ( inputs ) are converted into the outputs , or administrative decisions , policies , political favors , and laws .
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