Journal on Policy & Complex Systems Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2014 | Page 29

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of power . Power itself can , and often , attempts to stabilize a system to either strategize self-reinforcing feedback , promoting the status quo , or alternatively checking itself through , self-correction , or reflexivity , with the goal to move back to homeostasis again . Power seems to be what allows someone to take advantage of a leverage point for Meadows . xxvii Leverage points are where a small shift in one thing can produce big changes in everything . Leverage points are mobilized through power and the more power , the easier to take advantage of a leverage point and vice versa . A low leverage point causes a small change in system behavior with just a small amount of change force . High leverage points only need a small amount of power to create a large change in system behavior ( See Figure 5 ). To illustrate , in the women ’ s rights movement took many decades of rallies , demonstrations , speeches , legislative lobbying , discussions , as well as new laws and amendment for a systemic change for a low leverage point power to was applied consistently overtime . We argue that there are tensions at the political-economic level , the cultural level ( e . g ., media ); and the psychological level ( senses , needs ). Feedback relationships seek equilibrium . When it goes out of equilibrium , typically the reinforcing feedback becomes dominant , thus creating a discrepancy or an equilibrium gap . A balancing loop brings the system back toward equilibrium , or dynamic tension ( See Figure 4 ).
Karvonen ( 2011 ) finds , for example , that when the municipal government op� ens up to alternative voices , “ a feedback loop , with residents serving as a check on municipal government activities ” is created� ���� ��� . Ultimately , community engagement is about dialogue and mutual choice . Citizens share their collective voices on government matters . Citizens ’ voices are a positive , reinforcing feedback loop between residents and local government . When these voices are incorporated , they turn into a negative or reinforcing feedback loop to maintain a status quo , the status quo can be constricting without constant feedback , and , Easton notes , create instability in a system when demands are not met . As a result city officials , lose power . Positive , or reinforcing feedback , allows for needed adjustments and new states of equilibrium .
The Macro Level : The Political-Economic Element
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Community systemic power is related

to socioeconomic factors . As Stone notes , as resources go dry , governments turn to business “ because governments are drawn by nature of underlying economic and revenue-producing conditions to serve those interests . . .” ( Davies , 2010 , p . 75 ). Stone ( 1993 ) describes development regimes : for example , attempts to expand the city . Easton agrees these regimes require large amounts of resources and therefore often engage the systemic power of the community ’ s businesses . Gendron and Domhoff ( 2009 , p . 198 ) critique Stone ’ s insistence there is an unsaid deference to business for external reasons , but business is constantly exerting power for an advantageous position . xxix Both may be correct , as there is both deference to business and a continued positioning by the elite . Both forms of feedback are a response to the environment to maintain the status quo . These powers apply constant pressure with low leverage points to keep equilibrium for a systemic advantage preventing reinforcing feedbacks as much as possible .
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