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China had a unified power structure that continued over several dynasties producing many benefits . This social architecture can be viewed as a hub-and-spoke network . All power leads back to the centre . Conversely , Europe was a set of competing hubs , based around feudal families and emergent states . No single hub could dominate despite constant competition for ascendancy . Yet the hubs were linked via the small-world networks produced through aristocratic intermarriage . So although elites ( hubs ) competed they also had short paths of communication and influence between them . This composite social architecture created a form of scale-free network .
Complex network theory has established several results concerning the comparative properties of these kinds of networks . Scale-free networks are resilient to shocks and can easily adapt . Old hubs can be removed and new hubs can be added without disturbing system level performance .
Consequently scale-free networks provide a resilient basis for dynamic reconfiguration through innovation and diffusion . If one considers the replicator dynamics ( evolution ) on such networks then it is clear that a centralised hub-spoke system requires that the centre must control mutations in order to avoid losing power . However , in the decentralised scale-free networks , since there is no central power , a perpetual process of competition can occur , in a decentralised way , driving innovation and diffusion and making way for new hubs as old hubs fail to adapt . Again , complexity research applied to evolution on complex dynamic networks has provided many powerful examples of this .
In summary , Europe , historically , though less cohesive and stable than China , benefitted from much higher rates of innovation and diffusion . Root argues that the linkages and competition between the European states – facilitated by aristocratic and trade ties – supported a form of decentralised selection of ideas , practices and technologies . This drove high rates of innovation and diffusion while retaining resilience , at the system level , to the shocks that new technologies and practices generate . Nations fell but Europe as a whole advanced . This was a major force in promoting European ascendancy over the period of the Qing dynasty .
This is contrasted with a China that managed to establish a comparatively unified and centralised governance structure thus reducing internal competition , increasing efficiency in many areas , yet leading to a certain degree of stasis over long periods of its history . The Qing dynasty lasted from 1644-1912 , collapsing in chaos and bloodshed .
Democracy and the Modern Nation State
In the early 1990 ’ s , the idea that Western
style liberal democracy was some endpoint for all modern states was ������ defensible . This was encapsulated in modernisation theory and the famous “ end of history ” concept 1 . But two decades on things look different . Why ?
Root makes the case that we currently see many forms of democracies and these can only be understood by understanding the histories of the states that gestated them . This involves understanding the path-dependent nature of these histories and identifying the initial conditions and bifurcation points that shaped them . However there is no easy way to do this . Democracy is a complex system . Consequently there can be no
1
Francis Fukuyama ( 1992 ). The End of History and the Last Man . Penguin .
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