Policy and Complex Systems
tries to avoid cooperation or conflict , which contravenes their natural tendencies , leads to frequent changes and fragmentation of the coalitions .
The global alliance model rests on the model of coalition forming inspired from the Statistical Physics ’ model of Spin Glasses , through which the system of countries is compared to a collection of spins — tiny magnetic dipoles that interact with each other and align themselves in a way to attain the most ” comfortable ” position , the one that minimizes their energies .
The nominal model formally resembles the Ising model of Spin Glasses at zero temperature , where the Hamiltonian — the function that determines the physical properties of the spin system — is precisely concerned with minimization of the system ’ s energy . This physical analogy allows one to address the bilateral propensities between the countries as a means of maximization of the countries ’ individual gain ( minimization of their energy ) and as the principal guide in the coalition forming .
A major difference between the model of spins and the model of rational countries is the long horizon rationality of the countries in contrast to the spins . While the spins are able to foresee only the immediate effect of their shifts , the countries have the ability to maximize their individual benefits through a series of planned changes assuming possible losses in the intermediate steps .
Global alliance modeling of coalition forming based on Statistical Physics started from the work of Galam ( 2002 ). The global alliance model was later investigated by Vinogradova and Galam ( 2013 ) to study the stabilizing role of global alliances in the coalition forming within the long horizon rationality of actors . In general , the coalition as a form of aggregation among a set of actors ( countries , groups , and individuals ) has been studied using concepts from the theory of Spin Glasses ( Axelrod and Bennett 1993 ; Florian and Galam 2000 ; Galam 1996 , 1998 ; Hatamian 2005 ; Matthews 2000 ) with various social applications suggested in Galam ( 2002 ), Gerardo et al ( 2007 ) and Vinogradova and Galam ( 2012 ).
In this work , we address the problem of dissolution of one of the two opposing global alliances in the system — the external incentives that sustained the stability of the coalitions . In addition to the formal implementation of the dissolution , we study the fragmentation and instability of the coalitions as a result of dissolution within the contexts of uni-factor and multi-factor influences on stabilizations of the coalitions . Based on the new formulation , we provide an analysis of two remarkable historical cases of dissolution — the collapse of the Soviet State at the end of 1980s ( Kotkin 2003 ) and the recent internal conflict in Syria ( Fisher 2013 ; Hitti 2002 ).
The results shed a new light on the understanding of the complex phenomena of fragmentation of the coalition as a result of dissolution of the engendering global alliance and on the prospect of historical events .
2 Global Alliance Model Overview
Here , we recall the main components of the global alliance model of coalition forming among rational actors , describing the specifications of the instability and the stabilization of the coalition forming ( Vinogradova and Galam 2013 ).
2.1 Background — Natural Model and Instability
The spin glasses based model of coalition forming among rational actors can
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