Policy and Complex Systems - Volume 1 Issue 1 - Spring 2014
Dissolution of a Global Alliance : War or Peace
Vinogradova Galina A & Serge Galam B
This work investigates the effect of the dissolution of a global alliance in a collective of individual countries where the alliance , together with its antagonist counterpart , has previously generated stable coalitions . The model rests on the global alliance model of coalition forming inspired from Statistical Physics . Instabilities are a consequence of primary bond based interactions among rational actors and the stabilization is due to new interactions produced by the opposing global alliances . The stability consequences of the dissolution of one of them keeping the other one active are formally investigated within the confines of the model . Two landmark historical cases — the collapse of the Soviet Union and recent Syrian internal conflict — are reviewed . The results shed a new light on the understanding of the complex phenomenon of fragmentation , which may follow the dissolution of a stabilizing alliance .
Keywords : Social models , Statistical Physics , Coalition Forming , Coalition Stabilization , Political Instability .
1 Introduction
This work investigates the effect of the
dissolution of a global alliance in the case where two opposing alliances were coexisting producing a stable configuration in a collective of individual countries . The focus is on the effect of fragmentation and instability among the countries in the coalition that have been previously sustained by the dissolved alliance . While the presentation addresses the coalition forming and its eventual fragmentation in an aggregate of countries , the discussion and the results can be applied to any type of political , social , or economic collectives .
We rely on the model developed by Vinogradova and Galam ( 2013 ) to describe coalition forming driven by global alliances among countries as rational actors . Countries are coupled with short range interactions that form coalitions under the influence of external fields produced by the global alliances . The conditions for the stabilization of the coalition forming under both unique and multiple factors of influences on their interactions have been singled out .
Coalitions are formed from the attraction or repulsion forces acting between the countries . The latter are determined by the superposition of both the countries ’ spontaneous interactions , motivated by the static primary bilateral propensities of historical origins and the globally induced exchanges based on a planned profit . Each country chooses the coalition aimed to increase its individual benefit from the interactions with the linked neighbors . Contradictory associations into coalitions due to independent evolution of the primary historical propensities result in instability of the coalitions . The endeavor of the coun-
A
CREA — Center of Research in Applied Epistemology , Ecole Polytechnique , Palaiseau , France
B
CEVIPOF — Center for Political Research , Sciences Po and CNRS , Paris , France
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