Dissolution of a Global Alliance
Note that country 7 I having no significant impact on the i S
-countries initially happens to belong naturally to the Soviet global alliance S . Due to the new interactions , 7 I is detached from the N countries with which it was associated initially through a positive mutual bond and as such is attached to the S-coalition .
Here , the S-coalition holds the intermediary country 7 I only due to the attraction of the global alliance S . As soon as the Soviet alliance collapses , the country joined the N -coalition adjusting to its best configuration as shown in Figure 4c . The countries of the former Soviet coalition turn back to their respective initial negative propensities . However , the fluctuations of those countries do not affect the stable N-coalition for which the cooperative character of the interactions has persisted prevailing its stability . The overall system is thus semi-stable .
The intermediary countries are those disconnected or weakly connected to the Soviet Union . Those countries served as ” isolators ” between the two opponent coalitions , which impeded the instability of the Eastern side to propagate to the Western one . Among those countries were Hungary , Czech Republic , Poland , Yugoslavia , Czechoslovakia , Bosnia , and other countries of Northern and Eastern Europe . In 1999 , the first three of them were invited to join NATO . Membership has been expanded later to several Northern and Eastern European countries which then gained a new stability . In contrast , the Caucasian region on the Eastern side till today shows high instability .
4.3 Remarks on the Modeling of Dissolution
It is worth remarking that within the context of rational instability where the countries as fully rational actors can assume possible losses at maximization ; the semi-stability is only possible when the system consists of two disconnected ( or weakly connected , i . e ., connected by negligible bond values ) parts .
Modeling of the Soviet global alliance dissolution has already been discussed in Galam ( 2002 ) by connecting the decent of the global alliance exchanges to a change in the value of the countries ’ natural belonging parameter . Subsequent affiliation to NATO by some Eastern Europe countries was explained by reversing their natural disposition .
Although such a scenario provides an explanation for both the instability driven by the dissolution and the renewed stability in some specific part of the Eastern Europe , it contradicts the fact that the countries ’ natural dispositions are the result of a long historical process and cannot be modified at the will of a government . Instead , considering new well-designed global alliances seems to be more appropriate . In addition it could allow bringing in novel stable coalitions among the problematic regions such as Caucasus .
The above illustrations are typical examples of dissolution where a unique factor of interest allows each country to interact on the associated single dimension of the respective global alliance . It is a uni-factor stability process .
In contrast , the multi-factor stability process implies an equiprobable influence of both opposing global alliances on the countries . As we can see in Formula ( 6 ) for the total propensity in multi-factor form , both global alliances concurrently contribute to the new interactions between the countries and , thereby , to the stability of the coalitions .
Since the weakening of global alliance M , with any country i naturally be-
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