International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 8

International Journal on Criminology
----- In August 2004 it arrested two homegrown jihadis—Shahawar Matin
Siraj and James Elshafay—plotting to blow up Manhattan’s Herald Square
subway station [East 34th Street and Sixth Avenue] on the eve of theRepublican
National Convention to be held a block away. This was America’s first post
9/11 homegrown al-Qaeda-inspired plot to kill Americans.
The transformation worked. Intelligence Division Detectives now blended
their knowhow as investigators with the skills of the intelligence profession—
different tradecraft, different use of informants, and the need for greater patience.
But more change was needed from the pre-9/11 world of police intelligence.
-----A critical change needed was in how information was collected,
combined, and shared. This meant automation. As late as early 2002 the
Intelligence Division was still using a system in which debriefings were
hand written in triplicate using carbon paper, forwarded via an internal hand
carried mail delivery system, and kept in filing cabinets with limited chance
of collation, integration, and analysis. Decades of doing things this way
needed to change fast. Thanks to outside help, supervisors who recognized
the need for change and persistence at all levels, automation was injected
into the Intelligence Division earlier than elsewhere in the NYPD. It could
now learn what it knew.
-----The relationship between uniformed and civilian members of the
Intelligence Division also determined the effectiveness of its counterterrorism
program. In almost any large organization, a caste-like system can easily
develop that gets in the way of effectiveness. In the CIA the challenge, for
example, was linking operations officers with analysts. In the NYPD the
challenge was integrating uniformed personnel with civilian analysts. The
Division hired its first of many civilian analysts in 2002 to help identify the
“dots”, connect the “dots”, and then interpret what they meant and where
they led. In short, bridging this cultural gap—civilian and uniformed—was
critical to the success of the Intelligence Division.
-----The need for change never diminished. When one issue would be
identified and fixed, it often revealed a new set of issues needing attention.
Sometimes the layered constraints were a function of the 150-plus-year
history of the NYPD, which served the Department and New York City well
in addressing traditional crime. But if it impeded how intelligence addressed
the terrorist threat, it was met head on. This identifying and fixing problems
or finding a better way to do things became an essential part of the NYPD
Intelligence Division’s DNA—the commitment to continuous improvement
at every level and in every subordinate unit or program it undertook.
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