International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 69

Know What You Are Fighting
legitimate combatants. For the terrorists, this is an explicit recognition of the
pertinence of their misdeeds.
This also adds grist to the mill of some critics, who see Westerners as knowingly
using this vocabulary to appear to be fighting Islamist armies and not terrorist groups,
in reference to the Crusades.
Finally: Should We Engage in Dialogue with Terrorists?
Even indirectly, it is vexing to engage in dialogue with criminals, because it
is against our sense of morality and ethics, especially for those whose power comes
from laws. The aversion is even greater when the criminal targets the rule of law to
replace it with a fanatic and dictatorial system. This is true, of course, if “dialogue” is
understood as concession or a reversal (even symbolically) of roles. This “dialogue”
can also mean skillful responses, messages addressed to the psychological hostages of
the terrorists or aimed at protecting potential victims. These practices should serve as
the basis for communication with a neutralizing effect, targeting less at public opinion
than the criminals themselves, since communication is an integral part of the fight.
This communication would appear less as a negotiation than as a symbolic
retaliation to terror. While indifference aimed at minimizing or ridiculing the adversary
is sometimes used as a communications strategy in war, we should not forget that in
individual psychology, indifference pushes the individual to make him- or herself
heard by any means, even the most explosive ones. Indifference to terror runs the
risk of strengthening indoctrination. I would also emphasize that a mechanism of
identification encountering indifference sends the candidate for suicide a negative
image of the tyrannical father or another symbol of authority. And affective coldness
explains the psychological vulnerability of a weak individual fascinated by the
sponsors.
Official statements after an attack carry heavy consequences for the future.
Sponsors are always on alert and already thinking of the response that will weaken
the credibility of officials and they will use all the means at their disposal to this end.
To leave an impression and counter the initial official discourse, the terrorist response
has to be quick. That, then, is an important operational point to conclude this study:
the legacy of dramatic but instructive experience.
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