International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 6

International Journal on Criminology
-----Undertook over 50,000 visits to businesses that sell, store, or handle
goods or services known to have been used by terrorist operatives in
attacks abroad and warn of the risk should suspicious purchases be made or
attempted.
-----Developed and led partnerships with over 150 state and local law
enforcement agencies to assure that they coulddo what they could to help
prevent terrorist activitytargeting New York from gaining root in their
locales.
In sum, the NYPD Intelligence program built in the aftermath of 9/11 played
a major—but not sole—role in protecting New York City from additional terrorist
attacks in the years following that event. Beyond the arrests, prosecutions, and
convictions of dozens of individuals, we will never know what was prevented by
virtue of intelligence-driven interventions that helped divert individuals otherwise
on the path of radicalization to violence. These interventions took the form of
interviews after finding inflammatory language on Facebook page, for example,
interviews as follow-up to a “hot-line” call in, or threatening language someone
shared with a confidential informant or undercover. The sum of all this, plus the
many other NYPD CT programs implemented beginning in 2002, is that New York
City was not attacked despite the many efforts—known and unknown to us—to do
so.
Re-engineering Intelligence
The NYPD Intelligence Division had a long and sometimes fabled history in
the decades prior to 9/11. But aside from a stable of extremely talented investigators
and supervisors, it was not prepared for the mission of intelligence in the post-9/11
environment. No organization was. The re-engineering it subsequently went through
was unprecedented in its history, unchartered in that there were no roadmaps or
guideposts to follow or mimic and profound in that each person was going to be
asked to take on responsibilities and roles they did not join the NYPD nor the “old”
Intelligence Division to do. To do what was needed and what was done required
three essential elements:
-----First, leadership at the highest levels of the Department, Division, and line
units.
-----Second, dramatic cultural change among investigators, analysts, and
supervisors.
-----Third, an environment that produced ideas, engagement, and integration.
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