International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 46

International Journal on Criminology
himself the first leader of the GIA, a precedence that was recognized by his successors.
Still in February 1992, a group led by Méliani machinegunned the guard post of the
admiralty.
As every terrorism expert knows, however, forming groups, gathering
weapons, identifying targets, scouting places, keeping watch, and finally passing
into action takes months or even years. After the first terrorism attacks and during
search operations, security services found underground bunkers and caves, proof that
preparations had begun long before 1992. For a better understanding of the terrorist
projects of the FIS, even before it was created, we should read the letter (published
in the press) that Ali Belhadj wrote in prison: it shows how his Salafism was purely
for war. He assimilates the “peaceful” strike launched by the FIS in May and June of
1991 with the Battle of Ouhud fought by the Prophet and his companions against the
unbelievers of Koreich. Faithful to his positions from before the election of December
26, 1991, he condemns those who abstain, even Muslims or members of the FIS, those
who refuse to fight.
This letter shows the dual nature of the FIS. The armed groups formed after
the legalization of the party, continually active since that time, all had its benediction.
The fact that some refer to the position of the FIS at the time of creation of these
groups as complicit pacifism is not enough to absolve it. This party had its hand in
terrorist movements and beliefs. 34
Passage to Action and Criminal Self-Affirmation
Mafia, cartels, and terrorist groups: all of these criminal organizations use
violence to ensure their supremacy. This trial by force aims to show rivals, or the
populations under their sway, that criminal capabilities are available. And only
criminal leaders can carry out these significant abuses. The terrorist leaders active in
Algeria are all veterans of Afghanistan, habitual offenders, and criminals known to
the security services. For example, the famous terrorist leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar,
known as Laouar, or One-Eyed, who at the beginning of his criminal career, before the
period of terrorism in Algeria, was an arms trafficker.
For reinforcements, the criminal gangs recruited their “soldiers” among
sympathizers, for force or by indoctrination. However, this category was already in a
favorable pre-criminal situation, even if the group’s past did not count many criminal
acts. According to criminologist Raymon Gassin: “the effect of overdetermination
attached to the multiplication of dangerous situations is not blind; it first affects the
weakest personalities, those with a threshold of delinquency high enough not to
fall into crime under normal circumstance but too weak under new criminogenic
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The Djazarists Mohammed Saïd, Saïd Makhloufi, and Redjem Abdel Rezak; the Bouyalists Chebouti
and Méliani, those calling themselves Hidjra Wa Takfir overseen by Sediki Noureddine and Dr
Ahmed Bouamara, called Ahmed the Pakistani, the small groups of Bab El Oued and of the Mitidja in
general directed by Achir Redouane or by Moh Leveilley all, except one, formally obeyed the orders
of the FIS not to act before the first round of the elections in December 1991.
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