International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 146
Restorative Justice
even pushed by mediators to feel or act in a particular way; they were even literally
intimidated to take that direction. Immediate restoration, as experienced at the end
of the program, became harmful. The authors came to an obvious conclusion: there
is an urgent need to provide protection, verification, and monitoring of practices in
the field in order to check on the major discrepancies existing between the training
given and how it is actually implemented. These observations have been confirmed
elsewhere: the practice of perpetrator-victim mediation, especially in the matter of
serious crimes, appears to be completely effective—but only when the principles,
values, techniques, and fundamentals of the approaches are strictly followed (Urban,
Markway, and Crockett 2011). In 2015, Saulnier and Sivasubramaniam affirmed that
it is now important to concentrate on the operative conditions (the "procedure") of
restorative justice programs. The presence or absence of one of the parties (victim
or perpetrator), the indispensable—even forced—nature of admitting the facts by the
perpetrator, and so on, are some of the many variables that can transform a restorative
program into a real catastrophe.
Conclusion
What are the genuine benefits of restorative justice? On the basis of the
preceding developments, we need to reformulate the question as follows: What are
the benefits offered by each of the approaches in effect in restorative justice? In this
regard, which approaches are the most promising? According to Crégut (2016), the
most fitting conclusion is certainly that there is no ultimate model of restorative
justice suitable for every case. It important to realize that "restorative justice works
differently on different kinds of people" (Sherman and Strang 2007). Measuring
the effectiveness of restorative justice is distinct then from considering the breadth
of the restorative aspect of the processes, which involves a series of typological
scales measuring most notably the various levels of participation by the victim and
the perpetrator, the extent of the restoration for the victim, the state of the relations
between the parties at the end of the process (Weitekamp and Kerner 2002), and
whether they endure over time.
While benefits can, therefore, be observed in restorative justice, they are
essentially—and obviously—due to a form of procedural restoration (Pignoux 2008)
that upholds these programs, that is, when they are intended for perpetrators and
victims of crimes against persons and when they are carefully thought out, conducted,
prepared, and defined. In this regard, the humanistic approach by Umbreit (1996) or,
more recently, the relational approach by Charbonneau et al. (see Rossi 2015a) are
among the best examples of defined and framed models: this is because their scope
is strict and defined, their practices are proven, and the freedom of the persons who
participate is assured. The victims and perpetrators of offenses who move towards
restorative justice do it of their own free will, without ever being required to do so.
They should therefore have the permanent right to withdraw at any point or step
taken. It is only in these types of models (there are many others), that is, when such
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