International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 146

Restorative Justice even pushed by mediators to feel or act in a particular way; they were even literally intimidated to take that direction. Immediate restoration, as experienced at the end of the program, became harmful. The authors came to an obvious conclusion: there is an urgent need to provide protection, verification, and monitoring of practices in the field in order to check on the major discrepancies existing between the training given and how it is actually implemented. These observations have been confirmed elsewhere: the practice of perpetrator-victim mediation, especially in the matter of serious crimes, appears to be completely effective—but only when the principles, values, techniques, and fundamentals of the approaches are strictly followed (Urban, Markway, and Crockett 2011). In 2015, Saulnier and Sivasubramaniam affirmed that it is now important to concentrate on the operative conditions (the "procedure") of restorative justice programs. The presence or absence of one of the parties (victim or perpetrator), the indispensable—even forced—nature of admitting the facts by the perpetrator, and so on, are some of the many variables that can transform a restorative program into a real catastrophe. Conclusion What are the genuine benefits of restorative justice? On the basis of the preceding developments, we need to reformulate the question as follows: What are the benefits offered by each of the approaches in effect in restorative justice? In this regard, which approaches are the most promising? According to Crégut (2016), the most fitting conclusion is certainly that there is no ultimate model of restorative justice suitable for every case. It important to realize that "restorative justice works differently on different kinds of people" (Sherman and Strang 2007). Measuring the effectiveness of restorative justice is distinct then from considering the breadth of the restorative aspect of the processes, which involves a series of typological scales measuring most notably the various levels of participation by the victim and the perpetrator, the extent of the restoration for the victim, the state of the relations between the parties at the end of the process (Weitekamp and Kerner 2002), and whether they endure over time. While benefits can, therefore, be observed in restorative justice, they are essentially—and obviously—due to a form of procedural restoration (Pignoux 2008) that upholds these programs, that is, when they are intended for perpetrators and victims of crimes against persons and when they are carefully thought out, conducted, prepared, and defined. In this regard, the humanistic approach by Umbreit (1996) or, more recently, the relational approach by Charbonneau et al. (see Rossi 2015a) are among the best examples of defined and framed models: this is because their scope is strict and defined, their practices are proven, and the freedom of the persons who participate is assured. The victims and perpetrators of offenses who move towards restorative justice do it of their own free will, without ever being required to do so. They should therefore have the permanent right to withdraw at any point or step taken. It is only in these types of models (there are many others), that is, when such 145