International Journal on Criminology Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2016 | Page 14

International Journal on Criminology
investigative units they worked with. They were helped by the management decision
that, for operational security reasons, the operational reporting of each investigative
unit—whether the undercover unit or those handling confidential informants—was
compartmented from one another. As a follow-on decision, at the working level,
only the civilian analyst[s] involved in an investigation was authorized to see the
reporting from all CIs and UCs involved in that case.
-----It therefore fell to analysts to collate the information, analyze it,
identify gaps that needed filling, and set requirements for both the UC and
CI programs.
-----This empowerment of the analysts helped make them full partners with
the investigators; in the CI review noted earlier, the analyst and investigator
answered as a team. The integration of operations and analysis became
complete.
Cyber Intelligence Arrives
One of the first programs introduced into the re-engineered Intelligence
Division was its cyber unit. Started from scratch in late 2002, there was little
experience or know-how to begin with, but, a little at a time, new talent was added
and in-house expertise accumulated. The Division had learned quickly that the
Internet was fast becoming important for three reasons:
-----First, al-Qaeda and its affiliates were beginning tocommunicate their
ideology via the Internet as well as via CD’s and videos and thus the Internet
was rapidly becoming a source of radicalization.
-----Second, the Intelligence Division early recognized the Internet was
increasingly being used by already radicalized individuals around the world
to communicate with one another, forming “virtual” jihadi clusters, including
with persons in the New York City area, without ever meeting one another.
-----Third, the Internet had become a threatening source of information on
bomb-making material and techniques, explosive devices of all kinds, and
even how to communicate securely.
All of this underscored Commissioner Kelly’s 2003 media statement “that the
internet had replaced Afghanistan as a training ground for terrorism”. His comment
was prescient.
The cyber unit quickly established a unique tradecraft on where to look, what
to watch for, how to interpret what it was learning, and the roadmap of appropriate
follow-up. The Intelligence Division also had the advantage of deep language
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