International Journal on Criminology Volume 3, Number 2, Fall 2015 | Page 68

Organized Crime Behind Bars
often prostitutes. A neutron from Menard Prison, for example, was stabbed by an
enforcer 200 from the Latin Kings because he refused to conceal a weapon. Another
was regularly raped for refusing to join the gang.
To better control prison life, gangs practice a division of labor according
to the skills of their members and their objectives. Some act as security officers,
others gather intelligence (about other gangs, the administration, and the activities
of the justice department and the police). Others are in charge of physical training,
while some oversee landline telephones and reserve their use for members of their
organization.
How can the power that gangs hold over the prison population be explained?
The punishment they deal out—notably death—is always more severe than
that legally employed by the legitimate authority of the institution. The prisoners are
under no illusion that the nominal protection the prison administration is supposed
to afford them has any meaning whatsoever.
The intimidation of inmates may go far beyond the prison environment. It
is said, for example, that the 28 gang in South Africa “cries for eighty years.” This is
meant to convey that “nobody is beyond the reach of its vengeance.” 201 The gang has
a reputation for relentlessly hunting down traitors, which helps keep a tight rein on
those who might be tempted to testify against it. 202
Despite their proven pernicious nature, some still consider this kind of
“intermediate body” to be useful or even desirable. In an article in 2014, entitled
“Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System” 203 professors Garrett
Roth 204 and David Skarbek 205 proposed to “forget the outdated image of violent and
racist thugs coming together to rob the weakest...” According to them, prison gangs
are “vital elements of social cohesion... allowing violence to be kept at manageable
levels and creating a stable environment in which an economy based on contraband
can develop.”
This economic and behaviorist approach seems to forget the reality and daily
life of those who, imprisoned for small crimes, see their lives ruined forever.
200
A gang member charged with enforcing gang rules.
201
On December 10, 2003, a future “soldier” of the 28s passing through the initiation phase, appeared
before the High Court in Cape Town. He was accused of killing the mother of his child and his
neighbor, a boy of eight, to show his determination to the gang. The mother of the girlfriend of the
alleged murderer, who wished to testify, suffered intimidation for eight months by “unidentified”
individuals. “No witness, no procedure,” they told her. She is currently part of a witnesses protection
program, and lives anonymously far from her original home. Cape Argus, December 10, 2003.
202
Nonetheless, South African law requires prisoners to appear before the courts when they are
summoned, refusal being punished by two additional years. The law also provides for placement in a
“safe” prison. Haysom, Towards an Understanding of Prison Gangs.
203
Roth, M. Garrett and David Skarbek. “Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System.”
Review of Behavioral Economics, 1, 3 (2014), 223–243.
204
Oberlin College, Department of Economics.
205
King's College London, Department of Political Economy.
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