International Journal on Criminology Volume 3, Number 2, Fall 2015 | Page 44

Organized Crime Behind Bars
the prisons by henchmen or sympathizers, either obeying orders or willing to render
services for money. Not only phones make their way into prisons, but also drugs,
weapons, prostitutes and food. Since its show of force, the PCC has been politicizing
its proclamations and is implicated in the assassination of judges and the funding of
escapes. 81 The authorities appear to be overwhelmed.
On April 22, 2004 another rebellion in the Brazilian prison of Porto Velho came
to an end. Competition between two rival gangs led to five days of violence, the deaths
of nine people and 170 taken hostage. A thousand inmates controlled all the buildings.
In addition, three tunnels were discovered and destroyed: this indicated the preparation
of a mass escape, probably the origin of the feud between the prison gangs. 82
In June 2005, a riot at the CRP ended with the deaths of five prisoners—
undoubtedly traitors to the PCC, whose heads were displayed on spikes on the roof. In
December of the same year, twelve different operations targeted buses and police. The
final count was 19 dead and 20 wounded.
In May 2006, as ever from their cells using mobile phones, the leaders of the
PCC, under the direction of Marcola, directly challenged the São Paulo authorities in
response to their plan 83 to destroy the PCC by splitting its leaders up and getting rid
of them. Three hundred separate attacks were executed simultaneously against public
buildings and police stations, public transportation and banks. Seventy prisons suffered
riots. For several days, the region experienced unprecedented pressure in a climate of
near civil war. 43 policemen and 91 attackers were killed (170 people in total according
to some sources); sixty buses were burned.
Since these events, the PCC has been monitored more closely, especially
in the prisons holding its most important leaders. As a result of this pressure and
losses incurred, the PCC later had difficulty meeting its expenses. Wire taps made in
September 2006 revealed difficulties providing the “social services” usually available
to the families of its imprisoned or dead members, especially as recruiting to rebuild
its numbers required it to halve the “dues” levied on its members. 84 The PCC has also
been forced to decentralize parts of its command structure to compensate for the loss
of some leaders and the more stringent containment measures imposed on others.
More recently, it seems that the PCC has turned to other ambitions—it is seeking
no less than representation at the Brazilian parliament. Police reportedly intercepted a
conversation between Daniel Vinicius “El Ciego” Canonico, a Marcola spokesman and
a lawyer for the organization. 85 The strategy of the PCC appears to be the funding of
81
In São Paulo, the number of escapes rose from 552 in 1999 to 1023 in 2000. However, they were not
always successful: On November 8, 2003, more than 80 prisoners who tried to escape through tunnels
in São Paulo were met by the police as they came out. A number of others died of suffocation in the
tunnel.
82
AP, April 22, 2004.
83
Presented at a confidential meeting and immediately communicated to a lawyer for the PCC by a
sympathizer.
84
See below.
85
El Pais, April 3, 2008.
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