International Journal on Criminology Volume 3, Number 2, Fall 2015 | Page 123

Criminal–Terrorist Convergence
of the state). Examples of this convergence have been seen in Mexico, Brazil, Central
America, and South Asia. Here the toxic mix is fueled by corruption and allows the
maximum extraction of resources and wealth under the protection of corrupted
officials resulting in impunity. The operational expertise of the gangsters, combined
with the violent skills of terrorists, protected by corrupt state officials enable both
criminal and political ends—whichever is desired at the specific time. 27
The disappearance and likely murder of 43 normalistas (students) in Iguala led
to the arrest of the city’s mayor and his wife for ordering the atrocity in connection
with the Guerreros Unidos cartel. Corrupt local police are also implicated and there
have been allegations that both federal police and the military may be involved
(although the state denies that link). 28 The interaction between violence, corruption,
and organized crime has the potential to erode state solvency (capacity plus legitimacy)
and reconfigure states. 29
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Challenges
Understanding and addressing the convergence of transnational crime and
terrorism (which must also include the role of corruption) 30 pose many
difficulties for states. The first challenge is actually a basic intelligence
challenge. Because there are a diverse range of occult groups linked in novel and
rapidly changing, adaptive ways developing a collection strategy, plan, and capacity
is complicated and subject to bureaucratic and budgetary inertia. Specialty analysts
familiar with the groups may not be readily available and it might take time to develop
capacity. Once the capacity is developed the group-network configuration is likely
to have morphed. The remaining challenges are structural, and conceptual as well as
bureaucratic.
The major challenge set involves competition. There is competition for
intelligence, power, and bureaucratic standing within intelligence services and
intelligence components of police. At national levels, the intelligence services compete
with rival intelligence services as well as allied intelligence services in addition to the
intelligence capacity of their rivals (and make no mistake, terrorists organize crime
and gangs conduct intelligence operations). This intergovernmental rivalry also exists
within states (national) as federal and state (provincial) and local agencies (intelligence
agencies, police agencies, and fusion centers) vie for budget and recognition.
This fragmentation is a consequence of both politics and bureaucratic fiefdoms.
It can be overcome, but the steady state is competition. Similar fragmentation and
competition exists within agencies. For example within a single police agency different
units all address separate components of threat convergence. A major city police
department will have a patrol force that deals with crimes as they occur; a gangs unit
to investigate gang crimes; a homicide unit that investigates murders; an organized
crime unit that deals with the mafia; and narcotic units that deal with drug trafficking.
A separate intelligence and crime analysis units, as well as staff seconded to a fusion
center or terrorism early warning group are also likely to co-exist and compete for
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