International Journal on Criminology Volume 3, Number 2, Fall 2015 | Page 120

International Journal on Criminology
Convergence of criminal, terrorist, and insurgent threat streams (and actors)
is a study in illicit (and grey-area) networks and globalization. In fact, some view this
as ‘deviant globalization’ 2 where illicit flows are taped to extract resources, wealth, and
power. 3
Defining the nature of convergence is as complex as the variety of groups
involved. As a starting point, it is important to remember that all of the groups
involved in this treat convergence are criminal organizations. It is their motivations
(which shift with time, and are often mixed) that differentiate their specific niche.
Gangs themselves include street and prison gangs (often interconnected) that can span
several generations (or loci) of activity. Terrorists and insurgents are actively seeking
political change but rely upon a range of criminal activities to sustain their activities.
Mafias and cartels seek profit, but often use violence and attacks on the state to secure
space and freedom to operate. And of course, some groups morph and change focus
over time. Remember, Martin van Creveld (as I have often noted) said, “Future war
will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerillas,
bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal titles to describe
themselves.” 4
This essentially describes non-Trinitarian (van Creveld) or Fourth Generation
Warfare (4GW) 5 where hybrid bands attack society and societal bonds to destroy
political will. As Joseph Nye pointed out: “While particular generational delineations
are somewhat arbitrary, they reflect an important trend: the blurring of the military
front and the civilian rear. Accelerating this shift is the replacement of interstate war by
armed conflict involving nonstate actors such as insurgent groups, terrorist networks,
militias, and criminal organizations.” 6
Street gangs can be described as fitting into one of three generations: turf (1st
gen); market (2nd gen); and mercenary/political (3rd gen). 7 To complicate this, gangs
can be connected to other gangs and/or organized crime groups through franchise
arrangements, alliances, and familial linkages among individual members. This
makes power within the constellation of gangs subject to a set of complex networks of
influence. Cartels can also evolve or fall into three phases: 1st phase cartel (aggressive
competitor); 2nd phase cartel (subtle co-opter): and 3rd phase cartel (criminal state
successor). 8 The third-phase cartel envisioned a state competitor of the type seen in
Mexico’s criminal insurgencies. 9 Both criminal insurgencies and the emergence of
narco-enclaves 10 and criminalized (mafia) states involving hybrid criminal–terrorist–
state franchises pose a significant national and global security threat. 11 Essentially this
involves strategic crime.
Terrorists and insurgents, including jihadi networks, often rely upon crime to
support their operations. Drug trafficking, robbery, extortion, and smuggling became
potent revenue sources for terrorists and insurgents. This reliance on illicit revenue
streams also brings the terrorist networks and its individual actors into contact with
criminal gangs. New opportunities for revenue on both sides now exist to be exploited
and they are. Understanding these linkages is a challenge for police, intelligence, and
security scholars. (More on that later.)
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