Desert 1 : The Iran Hostage Crisis
Credited as a debilitating blow to President Carter ’ s re-election efforts , the unsuccessful attempt to release the hostages through Operation Eagle Claw highlighted a major overlooked component in the modus operandi of the U . S . Military , launching a damaging blow to U . S . international prestige and then President Carter ’ s re-election ambitions .
Fussell was quick to note that while on paper the planning might have seem bulletproof , the actual operation was everything but . Citing the failure of cohesive inter-service collaboration and the absence of adequate special operations training , Huggins highlighted the critical advancements resulting from this international fiasco . The formation of the Joint Special Operations Command would address the shortcomings of military operations at the time . Not only would they offer oversight for interoperability on various platforms , they would also ensure a well-trained cadre of special operatives . Huggins called for caution , warning us that we often run the risk of forgetting the lessons of the past and regressing once again .
One is Both , But the Other Is Not ? Most civilians are tempted to , out of no error of their own , use Special Operations and Special Forces interchangeable . Huggins , perhaps credited to the years of raising three wonderful daughters , graciously educated the audience on the difference and relationship between the two .
Special Operations Forces refer to the elite forces of a respective service ( they may be found in each branch of the military ) and trained to transcend the purview of a conventional unit . By the same token , the Special Forces ( while indeed they are a type of Special Operations Force ) are an elite unit within the U . S . Army only ( aka , the Green Berets ).
Turning slightly into a lesson in semantics , both Huggins and Fussell argued that while each unit , each member in the military is indeed special , perhaps the better choice would be to substitute the word “ special ” with “ unique ” – emphasizing the unique training and missions undertaken . Additionally , Fussell cautioned that while these are elite members with unique skills , the Special Operations Forces are not built to win wars .
The Impact of 9 / 11 : It ’ s No Longer 1987 While the world went into shock as our television screens replayed ( for weeks ) chilling scenes of the iconic Twin Towers crumbling unto the streets of Manhattan , the leadership of the military was arduously at work preparing for a counterattack against al-Qaeda .
Fussell recounts that after the 9 / 11 attack and the military response that followed , he witnessed a “ significant change there in how we conducted operations on the battlefield ” and he credited this awakening to the leadership at the time :
Senior leaders were managing a completely different type of global organization than we had come up inside of … it says a lot about the senior leaders of this last generation … to be able to recognize the need to change … We had very aggressive senior leaders who said “ no ”, we are built for the 80s and 90s and we have to change this right now .
While the onset of the fight in Afghanistan was rather conventional , it was in early 2004 that U . S . military noticed a shift in the battlefield . Citing the military ’ s inability to keep up with the growth of al-Qaida , Fussell accounts :
fighters from all around the world start to show up and they want to be part of this movement that they are seeing , and we , without realizing it we had entered this information age battlefield where decentralized authorities , an information based distributed network of actors , could move with real autonomy .
Not only was al-Qaida successful at recruiting many to the carnage that ensued , but they were operating in a leaner , more effective method that attributed its success to the decentralization of authority – something the U . S . military struggled with .
The result ? The leadership , at the General Level , agreed that it was time for meaningful change . While referring to the leadership ’ s call to action , Fussell recalls the decision to “ fundamentally shift the way we run ourselves as an organization … not that our teams are not good enough … we are collectively operating like it ’ s 1987 , and it is not .”
Some hurdles the military faced included , but were not limited to becoming efficient at passing information in real time , creating an ease with which intelligence could be shared across the services , efficiently allocating and sharing resources , and allowing larger degrees of autonomy to make local decisions . Fussell pointed out that it was a difficult process for the military to overcome these challenges , taking “ several years .”
Citing evidence of the military ’ s success at overcoming these operational challenges , Huggins drew on his experience , witnessing a cohesive collaboration between the conventional units and special operations even though there were high levels of competition .
One Big “ Easy ” Button Evolution is not a place but a journey , and the road is a long , circuitous , and arduous one . Fussell warned that while special operations forces are essential to perform unique missions to pave the way for future successes , these units , by themselves are not built to win wars . He cautions that there is a prevailing misunderstandiF Magazine | www . iFMagazine . net 39