INmagazine Zirve Özel | Page 57

ANA LİZ A Manager’s Guide to Competition Law and Ethics “It is a common syndrome among managers to develop a very dangerous self- confidence by seeing their staff attending competition law trainings every six months, as dictated by corporate rules. This practice should not be considered as a compliance program. Memorizing competition law requirements and deciphering the rationale behind it -- which is not rocket science, though -- does not guarantee a safe harbor.” Fevzi M. TOKSOY, PhD I personally observe that the ma- naging staffs of companies are becoming highly aware of com- petition law but this awareness is frequently related to the great label it holds as ‘something of a great threat to my career’. The principal objective in delivering this piece is to clarify the key aspects of competition law through its linkage to a general un- derstanding of compliance and ethics. Not to degrade other components of corporate compliance, competition law does indeed rank high in the overall compliance agenda of corporations. Sanctions designed to prevent busi- nesses from violating competition law are getting more and more severe. Es- pecially in the case of cartels, convicted companies are facing monetary fines amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, not to mention the loss of repu- tation that may cause irreparable harm to the value of a company. The main re- ason for such a severe punitive design stems from the fact that competition law violations are hard to detect and hence vigorous deterrence seems to be the most effective way to keep compa- nies and managers away from even the idea of breaching these rules. COMPETITION LAW BREACHES AS THE SNEAKY ENEMY OF ETHICAL CONDUCT Here, it is worth recalling what compe- tition law forbids. First of all, economic activities are expected to develop wit- hin existing competition among rival firms. The ideal outcome of a competiti- ve process in every economic activity is accepted to be better products at redu- ced costs. However, for a specific player, this process does not guarantee profit maximization or sustained presence in the market. These are such tempting goals for any entrepreneur in a market economy that sometimes competitors may wish to refrain from rivalry and instead may rationalize anti-competi- tive practices to achieve excessive pro- fits or to at least guarantee their seat at the table. To resist this temptation, two “commandments” [major orders] are globally accepted in all competition laws: first, thou shalt not conspire with competitors and second, thou shalt not misuse your market power to eliminate competition. The problem is that orga- nizations can violate these two prohi- bitions under many different scenari- os, not all of which should necessarily classify them as state-of-the-art robber organizations. We can align the multi- tude of anti-competitive conduct along a spectrum, from collusion-related an- ti-competitive conduct at one end to market-power related anti-competiti- ve conduct at the other. The ethics in- dicator points to the maximum rate of unethical when certain conduct is clas- sified as collusion-related. Such con- duct commonly identifies companies as ‘cartels,’ which is a “state-of-the-art robbery organization”. Cartels are designed to eliminate the fair result that an intervention-free competitive environment would other- wise provide to consumers. A study 1 shows that the total sales of products subject to cartel surchar- ges amount to 16 trillion US Dollars worldwide. This is a huge sum. This clearly means that we, as consumers, are deprived of innovative products in all markets, the sales of which make up this total amount. Since we are the producers of some of these products and at the same time consumers of ot- hers, we are not living the full potential of the present. This is economic time travel, where we have no other option than to go backwards. This explains the rationale behind the harsh deterrence mechanism in the fight against cartels, because no administrative or judicial resource in the world seems to be able to detect all cartels. This picture reve- als another type of competition. This competition is among the competition agencies in the effective fight against cartels. Innovative methods to fight cartels are introduced one after anot- her and armies of deterrence mecha- nisms are put into effect to discourage companies from forming cartels. Of course other types of competition law infringements exist, which also pose a serious threat to the proper functioning of competitive markets. Classified under market power relat- ed conduct, implementation of those anti-competitive practices leads to the foreclosure of the markets. In mar- 55