INGENIEUR
PBC
Capability Sustainment of:
Stage
%
Saving
1. Bomba Mi-17 Helicopter 3 6.35
2. Bomba Agusta A109/AW139 Helicopter 3 5.54
3. APMM CL-415 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 3 1.48
4. APMM Dauphin AS356N3 Helicopter 3 0.6
5. APMM Agusta AW139 Helicopter 3 0.82
6. KTMB GE Locomotive Class 26 3 10.42
7. KTMB Rolling Stock Wheel Component 1 0
8. KTMB Traction Motor Component 1 0
9. TUDM Air Traffic Control Systems 3 7.15
Table 4: Government capability sustainment PBCs as of July 2018
to examine the contractor’s overall report
card which summarises the result of all
performance measures (KPI, SPM and SHI).
The committee is to deliberate in greater
detail the result of the SPMs especially
those that touch the behavioural aspects
and how the contractor contributed towards
the achievement of the buyer’s Enterprise
Outcome and mission success. The key
decision of this committee is the rewards
and remedies, mainly in terms of prolonging
or shortening the contract tenure. This
committee is to be chaired by the head of
the buyer’s organisation.
It is important to note that every sustainment
contract is different and hence must be tailor-
made based on its unique requirements. In other
words, a PMF for one contract cannot be made a
template for another unless a full analysis is done.
Today, where open tender is the order of business,
the Government must specify PBC requirements
upfront as part of the tender process. As such,
PMF is the additional document that will be
packaged in Government tenders, along with the
rest of the specifications.
6
76
VOL
2018
VOL 76
55 OCTOBER-DECEMBER
JUNE 2013
IMPLEMENTATION
Over the last six years since its first implementation
in 2012, more than RM12 million have been
saved by the Government through nine capability
sustainment PBCs. The saving is actually the
payment that should be made to contractors but
was forfeited due to underperformance.
Behaviour change is one of the key outcomes
expected from 3 rd Generation PBC. Based on the
implementation of the above contracts, although
at first some contractors took the new contracting
approach casually, their behaviour changed
over time to satisfy the KPIs. The self-regulating
PBC has also eliminated the “blame” culture
amongst the contractors as well as improving
the contractors’ attitude towards the buyer.
Experience shows that irrespective of the value at-
risk of a PBC, contractors having positive attitudes
have fewer problems in satisfying the KPIs to
receive full payments, compared to contractors
with negative attitudes who are normally unco-
operative or arrogant. Those who always “hide
behind the contract” will not easily adopt the PBC
approach and will be difficult to work with.