By proactively identifying hazards, assessing
and characterising risks via obligatory process
hazard analysis, and taking actions to reduce
the identified, quantified risks, organisations can
prevent accidents and reduce the potential for
death, injury, property damage and environmental
impacts.
The PSM Standards also require written
operating procedures for correct operation to
ensure that tasks are conducted in a safe manner
and in accordance with the safety precautions
developed during process hazard analysis.
Implementation of mechanical integrity
assures that process equipment is in a
satisfactory condition to safely and reliably
perform its intended design function and operate
properly within the limits of established process
parameters as documented in the facility’s
process safety information.
In PSM, relevant changes that can affect the
process safety information upon which the process
hazards analysis is based, must be managed
through the management of change elements to
ensure that the operation and maintenance of the
process continues in the safest manner possible.
An audit to check that the process is operated as
required is critical. The main reason for auditing
or measuring the process safety performance is
to provide ongoing assurance that risks are being
adequately controlled.
The above describes the significant purpose
and integration of some of the PSM elements
for safer plant operation. Without question,
all the PSM elements are important and must
work together to provide the multiple layers of
protection that are relied upon for safe operation.
Conclusion
The layers of protections, even with their inherent
flaws, as a whole provide thorough defence for
safer process operation. Nevertheless, due to
weak competency, extreme operating conditions
of the processes, complexity of the processes and
the safeguarding systems plus the changes driven
by competition, cost pressures, management
methods and human behaviour, accidents do
still occur. Consequently, the provision of the
structured PSM programme elements should
systematically work to ensure reliable protection
in order to achieve the desired operational safety
objectives, which are to eliminate (or greatly
reduce) the number and severity of processrelated incidents.
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