Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 9

Indian Politics & Policy dian political parties and prime ministers have been in office. Diverse groups of Indian political leaders have repeatedly chosen circumspect responses that have clearly been intended to limit escalation to a major India–Pakistan war. Thus, the 20 th anniversary of the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosive tests is a propitious time to examine India’s political–military behavior in the shadow of nuclear weapons. This paper investigates a question of great importance for the future of crisis stability in a nuclearized South Asia: Why has New Delhi consistently chosen non-escalatory responses in the face of Pakistani aggression? There can be, of course, no mono-causal explanations for such vital and complex national security decisions. Numerous, varied pressures weigh heavily on decision makers, and different individuals and organizations prioritize these factors in different orders. In addition, each individual conflict episode has its own idiosyncratic contributing factors. Across the four episodes, though, broader patterns emerge from India’s policy choices that narrow causes down to the most essential ones. Broadly speaking, the explanations most often adduced by scholars for India’s cautious responses to Pakistani and Pakistan-abetted aggression identify four causes: (1) nuclear deterrence, or the fear that more lethal Indian military action would run the risk of Pakistani nuclear retaliation or set off an uncontrollable escalatory process that could lead to a nuclear exchange; 9 (2) timely and energetic U.S. diplomatic intervention to help manage conflicts and reduce tensions before they escalate to major war; 10 (3) an Indian “doctrine” of strategic restraint that predisposes political leaders to prefer nonmilitary responses to security challenges emanating from Pakistan; 11 and (4) a dearth of good conventional military options that would induce Pakistan to cease its provocations without running the risk of conflict escalation to major war, perhaps even to a nuclear exchange. 12 My main argument has two threads. First, three of these four causes—nuclear deterrence, U.S. crisis management, and the lack of good conventional military options—combine to best explain Indian forbearance in the face of Pakistani provocations. Second, the primary factor causing India to refrain from more vigorous retaliation has been nuclear deterrence. U.S. crisis management and the absence of good conventional military options were also influential across the four conflict episodes, but less so. These two causes are closely tied—and subservient—to the influence of nuclear weapons, which sparked U.S. crisis management efforts in the first place and severely limited Indian conventional military options. I argue that the least compelling explanation for Indian moderation is the ostensible doctrine of Indian strategic restraint, which stems mainly from the deterrent power of nuclear weapons themselves, not from any doctrine or abiding principle of Indian strategic culture. The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. The next four sections, respectively, provide succinct narrative accounts of the 1999, 2001–02, 2008, and 2016 India–Paki- 6