Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 53

Indian Politics & Policy
Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 150; Waltz, in Sagan and
Waltz, eds., Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 163.
190 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 52-53
191 Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 70-71, 106.
192 V.P. Malik, India’s Military Conflicts and Diplomacy: An Inside View of Decision Making (New
Delhi: HarperCollins, 2013), 127.
193 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 271. Also see: Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four
Crises and a Peace Process, 139 and Cohen, When Proliferation Causes Peace, 141.
194 Hagerty, “The Kargil War,” 112. Musharraf ’s assertion that Pakistan did not have an operational
nuclear weapons capability in 1999 is irrelevant in this context. At the time, Indian leaders had
to assume that Pakistan might have such a capability.
195 Black, Changing Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons, 16.
196 Black, Changing Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons, 16-18. These signals included threatening
statements by senior officials, raised alert levels, movements of ballistic missiles, ballistic
missile tests, and movements of nuclear-capable aircraft.
197 Mistry, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” 174; Sood and
Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 9.
198 Swami, “A War to End a War,” 150, 145.
199 Mistry, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” 174
200 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 278.
201 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 277. Narang’s analysis confirms and reinforces
similar conclusions reached previously by scholars, for example: Basrur, South Asia’s Cold
War, 62; Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 160, 163, 172, 173, 182;
Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 167-86; Kapur in Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan,
and the Bomb, 58; Dinshaw Mistry, “Complexity of Deterrence among New Nuclear States:
The India–Pakistan Case,” in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T.V. Paul,
Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 24;
Rajesh Rajagopalan, Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia (New Delhi:
Viking, 2005), 204; Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 83, 97, 116, 144, and Waltz, in
Sagan and Waltz, eds., Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 171-72.
202 “Interview: Ex-Pakistani Pres. Musharraf Mulled Using Nukes Against India after 2001
Attack,” The Mainichi, July 26, 2017.
203 Cohen, When Proliferation Causes Peace, 141-2.
204 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 197.
205 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 279.
206 Krepon, “Crises in South Asia,” 9. Singh “reportedly asked whether Pakistan could misperceive
an Indian conventional strike as a nuclear one and respond by launching its own nuclear
forces. No one could answer with any certainty.” Perkovich and Dalton, Not War, Not Peace?,
2. For other endorsements of the nuclear deterrence argument, see: Rafiq Dossani and Jonah
Blank, “Could the Kashmir Standoff Trigger Nuclear War,” rand.org, October 7, 2016; PTI,
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Deterred India,” The Hindu, March 10, 2009; and Waltz, in Sagan
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