Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 49

Indian Politics & Policy
V.P. Malik as saying: “Such strikes are a risky gambit,” as they “can trigger a full scale war.”
130 “We Feared Indian Strike: ISI Chief,” The Hindu, January 8, 2009.
131 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon, 22.
132 Basrur, 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, 22.
133 Nayak and Krepon, Unfinished Crisis, 13.
134 Black, “Structure of South Asian Crises,” 51.
135 Nayak and Krepon, Unfinished Crisis, 27.
136 Nayak and Krepon, Unfinished Crisis, 27-28. In the early 2000s, frustrated by their inability
to punish Pakistan for its persistent subconventional aggression, Indian military planners
developed ideas for conventional retaliatory options that (they hoped) would not cross
Islamabad’s nuclear “red lines.” For more details, see George Perkovich and Toby Dalton,
Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 73-103, and Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “Doctrine,
Capabilities, and (In)Stability in South Asia,” in Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in
South Asia, ed. Krepon and Thompson, 94-99. The so-called Cold Start option refers to the
rapid unleashing of shallow armored incursions along a broad front, intended to seize limited
territory and impose a political settlement on Pakistan. In theory, such a quick, measured
response could be undertaken before third parties (e.g., the United States) can get involved
in crisis management. Indian political leaders have been skeptical of these designs, and Cold
Start has never been official Indian doctrine, but Pakistani military planners had repeatedly
expressed to U.S. officials their concerns regarding Cold Start.
137 Nayak and Krepon, Unfinished Crisis, 19. Interestingly, both the external affairs minister,
Mukherjee, and the foreign secretary, Shivshankar Menon, favored a military response. In
addition to Nayak and Krepon, p. 19, see Menon, Choices, 61.
138 Nayak and Krepon, Unfinished Crisis, 7, 28.
139 Black, “Structure of South Asian Crises,” 51.
140 Basrur, 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, 22; Black, “Structure of South Asian Crises,” 19.
141 Emily Wax and Rama Lakshmi, “As Rice Presses Pakistan, Mumbai Residents Hold Massive
Rally,” Washington Post, December 4, 2008; Black, “Structure of South Asian Crises,” 51.
142 Nayak and Krepon, Unfinished Crisis, 42. See also Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, “India Planned
Strike on Muridke after Mumbai Attacks, Reveals Kasuri,” The News International, August 28,
2015.
143 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon, 21.
144 U.S. Embassy Islamabad to Department of State, “GOI Embassy Draws Distinction between
ISI and Civilian Leaders,” secret cable, December 5, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/nov/30/pakistan-usforeignpolicy1
145 U.S. Embassy New Delhi to Department of State, “Indian Foreign Secretary: ‘Huge Stake’
in Special Representative Holbrooke’s Success,” secret cable, February 17, 2009, http://
theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/192309
146 U.S. Embassy New Delhi to Department of State, “India Scenesetter for Special Representative
Holbrooke,” Secret Cable, February 12, 2009, http://theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-
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