Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 42

India’s Ways of (Non-) War: Explaining New Delhi’s
Forbearance in the Face of Pakistani Provocations
Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), 87-98; Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of
the Kargil Conflict 1999,” RUSI Journal, 147, no. 2 (April 2002): 24-30; Praveen Swami, The
Kargil War (New Delhi: LeftWord, 2000); and Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison
Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the
Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001).
4 On Pakistan’s support for JeM and other terrorist groups, see S. Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand
Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the Pakistani State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
5 In-depth studies of the Twin Peaks crisis include: P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen
P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington,
DC: Brookings, 2007), 149-83; Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 167-86; Kapur,
Dangerous Deterrent, 131-39; Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “U.S. Crisis Management in
South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Report 57, The Stimson Center, Washington, DC, September
2006; and V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New
Delhi: Sage, 2003).
6 On LeT and its connections to the Pakistani state, see Stephen Tankel, Storming the World
Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
7 Detailed accounts of the 2008 Mumbai attacks include: Myra MacDonald, Defeat Is an Orphan:
How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asian War (London: Hurst, 2017), 189-207; Shivshankar
Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings,
2016), 60-81; Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, The Unfinished Crisis: U.S. Crisis Management
after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2012); Bruce Riedel,
Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 2013), 1-25; Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The Siege: 68 Hours Inside the Taj
Hotel (New York: Penguin, 2013); and Tankel, Storming the World Stage, 207-33.
8 For overviews of the Uri attack and Indian response, see Arka Biswas, “Surgical Strikes and
Deterrence-Stability in South Asia,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 115 (Observer Research
Foundation, New Delhi, June 2017); Nitin A. Gokhale, Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot,
Surgical Strikes and More (New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2017), 1-52; Lalwani and Haegeland, eds.,
Investigating Crises; MacDonald, Defeat Is an Orphan, 255-61.
9 Representative treatments include: Sumit Ganguly in Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur,
India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010); Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry; Vipin Narang, Nuclear
Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2014), 253-82; and Kenneth Waltz in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth
N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3rd ed. (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2013).
10 See Dinshaw Mistry, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia,” Security
Studies 18, no. 1 (2009): 148-82; Nayak and Krepon, “U.S. Crisis Management”; Nayak and
Krepon, Unfinished Crisis; Moeed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis
Management in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018); and Moeed Yusuf
and Jason A. Kirk, “Keeping an Eye on South Asian Skies: America’s Pivotal Deterrence in
Nuclearized India–Pakistan Crises,” Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 2 (May 2016): 246-
72.
11 Works in this vein include: Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming:
India’s Military Modernization (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2010); Sunil Dasgupta and
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