Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 30

India’s Ways of (Non-) War: Explaining New Delhi’s
Forbearance in the Face of Pakistani Provocations
border. 195 Senior officials on both sides
exchanged pointed, aggressive, nuclear-tinged
threats. Pakistani president
Musharraf recollects that he transmitted
repeated nuclear-deterrent messages
to Indian prime minister Vajpayee
via intermediaries. One retrospective
analysis counted 17 nuclear threats,
nine issued by Pakistan and eight by India.
196 India was ready to launch major
conventional military operations, and
Vajpayee apparently came very close to
making a decision for war in both January
and June 2002. 197
Instead, he chose peace. Authoritative
accounts based on extensive interviews
point to nuclear deterrence as
the main factor inducing New Delhi to
stand down. “The risk of nuclear escalation,
[Indian] officials said, was important
in shaping Indian policy responses.
Vajpayee feared that a full-scale military
response to Pakistan-backed terrorism
could precipitate a wider conflagration.”
Even small reprisals across
the LOC could lead to an escalatory
spiral—a “possibility unacceptable in a
nuclear South Asia.” The same source
concludes that “nuclear weapons played
a central role in ensuring that the crisis
provoked by the terror strike on India’s
Parliament did not lead to war.” 198
Vajpayee’s National Security Adviser,
Brajesh Mishra, recollects that in January
2002 there “was a 90 per cent possibility
of going to war.” 199 Mishra says:
“we were pretty sure—fairly certain—
that if we crossed the border, Pakistan
would threaten the use of nuclear weapons.
Actual use is uncertain, perhaps
doubtful.” In Mishra’s view, “the risk of
nuclear weapons use increased sharply
as soon as Indian forces crossed either
the LOC ... or more critically the international
border.” He maintains that
“there was no such thing as limited war
in the India–Pakistan context, arguing
that ‘if you cross the [LOC] or the
Punjab border there is bound to be an
all-out war,’ and that Pakistan would escalate
and this would be the mechanism
for nuclear use.” 200 Narang writes: “Just
as in Kargil, India was—at great cost—
deterred from employing limited, let
alone overwhelming, conventional
force against Pakistan across the international
border or the LOC. Although
several factors may have stopped Delhi
from executing Parakram, the role of
Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture
in deterring India’s conventional
assault was crucial .... Such an attack,
as was contemplated in May and June
2002, risked triggering nuclear use and
was thus no longer possible.” 201 Indian
fears were shared across the border. In
interviews, President Musharraf has recalled
“many sleepless nights” just after
the Parliament attack, asking himself
whether he would or could deploy nuclear
weapons.” He “contemplated the
use of nuclear weapons, but decided
against doing so out of fear of retaliation.”
202 During the second peak of
the crisis, Musharraf remembers that
he “hardly slept for several nights”
and “feared nuclear war.” According
to Michael Cohen, who interviewed
Musharraf,” the latter “knew that any
Indian invasion would have quickly
triggered Pakistani nuclear escalation,”
and he “worried that nuclear war would
engulf his country.” 203 In sum, the Twin
Peaks crisis had the effect of further
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