Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 29

Indian Politics & Policy
that the prospect of a Pakistani nuclear
reprisal deterred New Delhi from escalating
the conflict in ways that not only
would have worked to India’s tactical
advantage, but also would have saved
Indian lives.” 189 Paul Kapur marshals an
impressive roster of senior Indian officials
who deny that Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons deterred Indian forces from
breaching the LOC in 1999. 190 But, other
accounts suggest that some of those
same Indian leaders were actually very
mindful of the nuclear dangers. One
observes that “Prime Minister Vajpayee
was known to have seriously considered
a Pakistani nuclear strike had India escalated
the war.” In a “crucial closeddoor
meeting, ... Vajpayee expressed his
apprehension about Pakistan using the
nuclear weapon if India enlarged the
conflict by crossing the LOC.” 191 Army
chief Malik recounts that “the nuclear
weapons factor played on the minds of
the political decision makers ... political
and military planning and preparation
for conflict escalation had to be carried
out carefully. Escalation control
was essential.” 192 It was not the fear of
an immediate Pakistani nuclear reprisal
that deterred New Delhi from sending
its army across the LOC; it was, rather,
Indian officials’ understanding that
the war could escalate from there to
the international border, and perhaps
beyond, into the nuclear realm. Many
observers have pointed out that this dynamic
represents a distinct shift in Indian
behavior since the 1965 war, which
began with a clandestine Pakistani effort
to foment rebellion among Muslims in
Indian Kashmir. For example, Narang
writes that: “The BJP, fearing Pakistan’s
now-credible nuclear threats, curtailed
the Indian military’s options to expel
Pakistani forces and strictly prevented
any operations on or above Pakistani
soil. This was in striking contrast to the
manner in which India had conducted
previous engagements with Pakistan,
most notably in response to the 1965
infiltration, which provided the blueprint
for Kargil.” 193 Although Indian
officials are circumspect about admitting
that they were deterred by Pakistan
from choosing more muscular military
options, for the reasons noted above, “it
is exceedingly difficult to imagine their
having been so restrained in the absence
of the dissuasive power of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons. This is especially
so when 1999 is viewed in contrast to
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, when—in
response to successive Pakistani provocations—India
chose escalatory options
both in disputed Kashmir and along the
international border.” 194
The influence of nuclear deterrence
on Indian calculations during
the 2001–02 crisis was even more profound.
For nine months after the attack
on the Parliament complex, India and
Pakistan’s armed forces were mobilized
along the international border and
LOC, including long stretches of time at
their highest alert levels. India enjoyed
an advantage with three strike corps to
Pakistan’s two; unlike during Kargil, the
Indian strike corps were poised for action
in their forward launch areas. Both
sides tested nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles and repositioned missiles closer
to the international border. Pakistan
also deployed its nuclear-capable attack
aircraft to forward bases near the
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