Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 26

India’s Ways of (Non-) War: Explaining New Delhi’s
Forbearance in the Face of Pakistani Provocations
dozen or fewer” killed is probably closer
to the mark. 170
While some early accounts of
the Indian strikes portrayed them as
a fundamental change in New Delhi’s
policy regarding Pakistan’s support for
subconventional operations across the
LOC, 171 it was soon revealed that India
had occasionally executed its own
shallow incursions across the LOC to
prevent and disrupt such operations. 172
What was different this time was the
“public—and political” announcement
of the strikes. 173 Of all the available military
options, Modi had chosen the one
that was least likely to escalate into a
larger conflict with Pakistan, 174 while at
the same time sending a message to Islamabad,
the international community,
and Modi’s frenzied domestic audience.
Indeed, the option he chose was so limited
that Pakistani leaders were able to
deny that it even happened, so as to preempt
pressures from their own public to
retaliate in ways that might spark escalation.
Pakistani officials termed India’s
assertion of “surgical strikes” a “fabrication,”
claiming instead that two of their
soldiers were killed by Indian forces firing
across the LOC. 175 New Delhi had
also received diplomatic cover from the
United States in the form of a telephone
conversation between national security
adviser Doval and his U.S. counterpart,
Susan Rice. In that conversation, which
seems to have occurred just before the
strikes, Rice “strongly condemned” the
Uri attack and highlighted the “danger
that cross-border terrorism poses to the
region.” 176 Indian officials publicized
Rice’s message at the same time that the
surgical strikes were announced, leaving
the strong impression that Washington
supported India’s right to self-defense
and did not oppose the attacks.
In the immediate aftermath of India’s
surgical strikes, both sides braced
themselves for more violence. Fearing
a Pakistani reprisal, India ordered an
evacuation of communities in a 10-kilometer
belt along the Punjab border
between the two countries. 177 New Delhi
also raised the alert status of its Western
and Northern commands and canceled
leaves in both commands, 178 while
the Pakistan Army maintained its own
heightened state of readiness and also
canceled all leaves. 179 Clashes continued
in their “normal” fashion across the
LOC, with regular exchanges of small
arms and mortar fire. 180 At the same
time, the two governments indicated
that they did not wish to see the fighting
escalate. In the first week of October, the
Indian and Pakistani national security
advisers spoke by phone multiple times
and agreed to defuse tensions along the
LOC. 181 Modi’s decision to retaliate in a
limited way across the LOC, targeting
militants rather than Pakistan army
forces, combined with Islamabad’s decision
to deny that the surgical strikes
had even taken place, dampened what
otherwise might have developed into a
full-blown Indo-Pakistani crisis.
Comparative Analysis
This section analyzes the relative
strength of the four most common
explanations for India’s
moderation in response to Pakistani and
Pakistan-abetted armed provocations
over the last two decades. Again, this is
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