Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 25

Indian Politics & Policy
mir. In a speech before the U.N. General
Assembly (UNGA) on September 21,
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif argued
that “a new generation of Kashmiris
has risen spontaneously against India’s
illegal occupation—demanding freedom
from occupation. Burhan Wani,
the young leader murdered by Indian
forces, has emerged as the symbol of
the latest Kashmiri intifada,” while New
Delhi has responded with “brutal repression
by India’s occupation force of
over half a million soldiers.” 162 During
the UNGA meeting in New York, U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry met with
both Sharif and Indian External Affairs
Minister Sushma Swaraj, urging
them to avoid escalating the conflict in
Kashmir. 163 At home, Pakistani leaders
girded themselves for a potential Indian
attack, while at the same time issuing
their by-now characteristic nuclear
deterrence threats. Army chief Raheel
Sharif said that his forces were in their
“highest state of vigilance” along the
border. 164 PAF fighter aircraft practiced
takeoffs and landings on a major sixlane
highway connecting Islamabad
and Lahore, in the process blocking
traffic and closing commercial airspace.
Although officials characterized this as
a “routine” air defense exercise, it was
anything but. 165 Meanwhile, in a September
26 television interview, Pakistan’s
Defense Minister, Khawaja Muhammad
Asif said: “Tactical [nuclear]
weapons, our programmes that we have
developed, they have been developed
for our protection. We haven’t kept the
devices that we have just as showpieces.
But if our safety is threatened, we will
annihilate them [India].” 166 However,
unbeknownst to Islamabad, Modi had
already made his decision in favor of a
limited military strike and conveyed it
to his senior-most advisers on September
23. 167
On September 29, Indian DGMO
Singh announced that the army had
carried out “surgical strikes” the night
before against terrorist “launch pads”
on the Pakistani side of the LOC. “Terrorist
teams,” he said, “had positioned
themselves” at these staging areas “with
an aim to carry out infiltration and
terrorist strikes in Jammu and Kashmir
and in various other metros in our
country.” Singh claimed that the Indian
strikes had caused “significant casualties,”
but pointedly added that the army
had no “plans for continuation of further
operations.” Lastly, Singh said that
he had informed the Pakistani DGMO
of the Indian operation and “explained
our concerns.” 168 In the following days,
details of the “surgical strikes” emerged
in the Indian and international media,
although many of them were contradictory
or simply mistaken. 169 Apparently,
some 70–80 special forces commandos
crossed the LOC on foot under cover
of Indian mortar and machine gun fire.
Armed with assault rifles, rocket-propelled
grenades, shoulder-fired missiles,
pistols, and plastic explosives, the
soldiers advanced some 1–3 kilometers
into Pakistan-administered territory
and attacked six to seven launch pads—
essentially safe houses where militants
gather prior to infiltration across the
LOC. Early Indian estimates put the
number of militants killed in the raids
as high as 45, which is almost certainly
inflated. The Economist’s estimate of “a
22