Indian Politics & Policy Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2018 | Page 21

Indian Politics & Policy
to take the strongest possible measures
to ensure that there is no repetition of
such acts.” 127 On the other hand, Indian
officials repeatedly maintained that the
political leadership had decided against
military action. 128 Meanwhile, reputable
media accounts in early December
tended to focus on the possibility of
so-called surgical strikes against “militant
infrastructure” in Pakistani Kashmir,
even as prominent national-security
figures weighed in with warnings
about the dangerous consequences of
even limited attacks. 129 Across the border,
Pakistani leaders, uncertain which
of these messages were authentic, grew
fearful that India was gearing up for a
military response and braced themselves
for an attack. 130 One retrospective
account suggests that both the Indian
and Pakistani air forces raised their
alert levels “during and immediately
after the attacks,” and that Pakistan put
its “advance ground units on alert.” 131
Pakistan’s concerns about Indian military
action drove esteemed nuclear scientist
Samar Mubarakmand to note in
a television interview that Pakistan was
“capable of launching a nuclear missile
against India with ten minutes’ notice,”
and that “the force that launched first
had an advantage.” 132
As in 1999 and 2001–02, U.S.
policymakers were quick to mobilize in
an effort to prevent Indo-Pakistani tensions
from spiraling into a full-blown
crisis or even war. Within 24 hours of
the attacks, President Bush had spoken
with both the Indian and Pakistani leaders
by telephone. He counseled restraint
and offered investigative resources to
India. The administration also began to
coordinate with President-elect Barack
Obama, who would inherit the aftermath
of the crisis in January 2009. 133 A
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
team arrived in Mumbai on December
1. 134 U.S. decision makers initially
feared that India might carry out air
strikes on LeT camps in Pakistan. LeT’s
“home base” was in Muridke, Punjab, in
a heavily populated area about 20 miles
north of Lahore. Said one official: “It
would have meant a conventional war
or worse. Plus the bad guys would have
been long gone.” 135 Another concern
was that Pakistan might try to preempt
limited Indian Army thrusts across the
international border, often referred to
under the moniker of “Cold Start.” 136
U.S. analysts tried hard to read Indian
intentions as the confrontation unfolded,
but their view inside the CCS was
“incredibly murky.” 137 As one granular
narrative summarizes U.S. perceptions:
“The Mumbai attacks sparked concerns
about a replay of escalatory actions by
India and Pakistan” during the Twin
Peaks crisis. “Indian officials were ...
blaming Pakistan for the attacks. Any
conflict between the two nuclear-armed
neighbors could get out of hand. Pakistani
leaders vowed to respond to any
attack by India as a threat to Pakistan’s
sovereignty and survival, while Indian
leaders pointedly did not take off the table
limited-war scenarios.” 138
Senior U.S. officials also traveled
to the region to meet with their Indian
and Pakistani counterparts. Secretary
Rice interrupted a trip to Europe to
meet with Mukherjee on December 3.
She cautioned New Delhi against actions
that might produce “unintended
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